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INTRODUCTION
The jurisprudential evolution of evidence law is dead. At least, that’s what
we’re expected to believe. After all, it’s been forty-seven years since the
common law pedigree of evidence law came to an end in the United States.1
Ushered in on the wings of a growing positivist movement,2 the enactment
of the Federal Rules of Evidence purported to quell judicial authority over
evidence law.3 Instead, committees, conferences, and members of Congress
assumed responsibility for regulating our evidentiary regime, thereby
capturing the evolution of evidence law in a single, transparent code.4 And as
with other transitions to positive law, perhaps that shift inherently suggested
that the Federal Rules of Evidence are “not a living organism” but simply a
“legal document” that “says what it says and doesn’t say what it doesn’t say.”5
Of course, a dead evidentiary regime is not inherently anathema. Indeed,
there are compelling arguments in favor of taking the lifeforce out of written
law. By channeling all legal change through rulemakers and elected oﬃcials,
controlling evidence law becomes clear and uniform across jurisdictions.6
Litigants can more readily predict which evidence is admissible and which

1 On January 2, 1975, the common law roots of evidence law gave way to a codiﬁcation
movement, culminating in the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub.
L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
2 See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Unrecognized Triumph of Historical Jurisprudence, 91 TEXAS L. REV.
615, 615 (2013) (reviewing DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
AND THE TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY (2013)) (“[L]egal positivism arose in the nineteenth
century to challenge natural law . . . the Hart-Fuller debate of the late 1950s marked the reenergizing
of legal positivism . . . .”); ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR., NANCY LEVIT & RICHARD DELGADO,
JURISPRUDENCE CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY: FROM NATURAL LAW TO POSTMODERNISM
78-80 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the evolution of positivism during the twentieth and twenty-first century).
3 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond “Top Down” Grand Theories of Statutory Construction:
A “Bottom Up” Interpretive Approach to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 75 OR. L. REV. 389, 416 (1996)
(“Congress continues to challenge the traditional, common-law judicial hegemony over evidence law.”).
4 See Michael Teter, Acts of Emotion: Analyzing Congressional Involvement in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 153, 154 (2008) (summarizing the legislative process established by
the Rules Enabling Act for promulgation of and amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence).
5 Interpreting the Constitution, C-SPAN (Mar. 14, 2005), at 18:47, https://www.c-span.org/video/?1858831/constitutional-interpretation [https://perma.cc/K8WP-EB6A] (“And the Constitution is not a living
organism, for Pete’s sake. It’s a legal document, and like all legal documents it says some things and it
doesn’t say other things.”); Darren Schenck, An American Original(ist), USC GOULD (Apr. 12, 2012),
https://gould.usc.edu/about/news/?id=3867 [https://perma.cc/8G3M-ZJLA] (“[The Constitution] says
what it says and doesn’t say what it doesn’t say.”).
6 See William Reynolds, A National Codification of the Law of Evidence: Its Advantages and
Practicability, 16 AM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1882) (“[T]he codiﬁcation of the law of evidence would aﬀord a
needed opportunity to amend, improve, and harmonize it.”); Glen Weissenberger, The Former
Testimony Hearsay Exception: A Study in Rulemaking, Judicial Revisionism, and the Separation of Powers,
67 N.C. L. REV. 295, 331 (1989) (“[T]he very purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to create
uniformity which was previously lacking in evidentiary rules in the federal courts.”).

2022]

The Living Rules of Evidence

939

evidence will be thrown out well before their trial date.7 Moreover, as a matter
of political theory, the eﬀort to codify evidence law ensures that rules
regulating the ﬂow of information in the courtroom are the product of careful,
deliberate, and politically accountable actors.8 In the abstract, then, the turn
to a codiﬁed evidentiary regime seems rather beneﬁcial.
But reality is often unkind to abstract ideals. Frameworks that seem
normatively desirable in vacuo often see problems emerge in application. And
the Federal Rules of Evidence are no exception.
The inherent diﬃculty accompanying evidence law’s transition to an
unﬂinching code stems from the historic turbulence of evidence law itself.9
Since its relatively recent emergence in the late eighteenth century, evidence
law has not been particularly stable.10 Indeed, for much of its history, evidence
law was rather shallow in substance. In 1806, for example, a judge made the
somewhat hyperbolic assertion that “[t]here is but one decided rule in relation
to evidence, and that is, that the law requires the best evidence.”11 Hyperbole
aside, early evidence law was certainly a diﬀerent creature than its modern
descendant. In the early era, there was no ﬁrm exclusionary rule barring
hearsay from the courtroom.12 Character evidence was fair game.13 Judges
frequently advised juries on the merits of cases.14 Fearing perjury, many states
still did not allow defendants to oﬀer sworn testimony in the courtroom as
late as 1890—just eighty-ﬁve years before the codiﬁcation of the Federal Rules
7 See Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA L.
REV. 413, 462 (1989) (“Some predictability necessarily ﬂows from a code of rules that is both
accessible and uniform.”).
8 See Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 418-19 (describing the rigorous legislative process and
“evident care” with which the Federal Rules of Evidence were drafted).
9 Cf. John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1169-72 (1996) (documenting the historical rise and evolution of evidence law).
10 John Henry Wigmore and John Langbein dispute the actual emergence of evidence law. See
id. at 1171-72. Wigmore contends that evidence law emerged during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, and attributes a lack of sources defending that position to poor historical recordkeeping.
See id. at 1171-72. John Langbein, conversely, sees the lack of sources as demonstrative of an absence
of a robust evidentiary regime. Id. at 1172. Langbein places the emergence of evidence law in the
end of the eighteenth century. Id.
11 2 ROBERT J. POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS OR CONTRACTS 129
(William David Evans trans., Philadelphia 1826); Langbein, supra note 9, at 1173-74 (describing the
source of the quotation as a North Carolina court in 1806).
12 Langbein, supra note 9, at 1189 (“On the state of the sources, it is hard to believe that the courts
of the mid-eighteenth century enforced the hearsay rule or any of the other modern exclusionary rules
that balance the potential prejudiciality of witness testimony against the supposed probative value.”).
13 See Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV.
988, 993 (1938) (noting that the early rule against character and propensity evidence “did not exclude
all similar bad acts, but only acts relevant merely through disposition”).
14 See Langbein, supra note 9, at 1181 (“[Some judges] exercised astonishing powers of judicial
comment and instruction, a dimension of the mid-eighteenth-century trial that helps explain why
the modern law of evidence could remain as yet so primitive.”).
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of Evidence.15 As late as 1881, civil parties, too, were disallowed from oﬀering
sworn testimony in the courtroom.16
Taken as a whole, then, stability in our evidentiary regime has been the
exception, not the rule.17 The changes made to evidence law in just the
century or two prior to the codiﬁcation movement were fundamental in
nature. Rather than ﬁne-tuning a relatively stable machine, judges and state
legislatures introduced massive reforms that sought to both align evidence
law with evolving cultural norms and better ensure that trials achieve their
ultimate goal of accurate, legitimate verdicts.18
But the codification movement froze evidence law in time. The
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 took the then-existing
culmination of a rapidly developing legal doctrine and suspended it at a
rather arbitrary point in history.
Of course, evidence law’s civil turn need not necessarily have led to
substantive torpidity. Rulemakers are certainly capable of evaluating whether
evidence law is achieving its normative aims and amending the regime when
it’s seen to be falling short.19 Indeed, there are now committees and
conferences tasked with assuming the role of the common law judge by
proposing beneficial changes.20 If the codification effort simply transmuted the
evolution of evidence law from judicial caselaw to administrative and legislative
channels, the effort would rightly be seen as benign—perhaps even desirable.
Codiﬁcation, though, has bred entrenchment. The arrival of the Federal
Rules of Evidence ushered in an anomalous era in evidence law, an era marked
by relative stagnation in the doctrinal space. That’s not to say that rulemakers
have been lazy. Far from it. In the last half century, they have introduced no
less than thirty substantive amendments to the Federal Rules and have

15 See Robert Popper, History and Development of the Accused’s Right to Testify, 1962 WASH. U.
L.Q. 454, 464 n.49 (listing several states that did not pass defendant testimony laws until after 1890).
16 Id. at 669 tbl.2 (detailing how it took Delaware until 1881 to enact a statute permitting
testimony by civil parties—the last recorded state to do so).
17 See MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 5-6 (1997) (“As is well known, the
institutional context that prevailed in the formative period of common law evidence has undergone great
changes in this century: the importance of the jury has dramatically declined, trial-centeredness has
largely been abandoned, and even party control over the proceedings . . . has not be spared a challenge.”).
18 See, e.g., George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 672 (1997)
(documenting the progressive historical abolishment of evidentiary rules that prohibited
“[t]estimony by [n]onwhites and [c]ivil [p]arties”). See generally FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules
should be construed so as to administer every proceeding fairly . . . to the end of ascertaining the
truth and securing a just determination.”).
19 See Glen Weissenberger, The Proper Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Insights from
Article VI, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1615, 1623 (2009) [hereinafter Weissenberger, Insights from Article
VI] (“[T]he drafters understood and expected that any problems with the Federal Rules of Evidence
could be solved through modiﬁcation or amendments.”).
20 See Teter, supra note 4, at 155.
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entertained scores more.21 But the approved changes have been modest.
Unlike the fundamental transformations in evidence law in the era leading up
to codiﬁcation, most of the amendments since the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence make only minimal alterations. A 2020 amendment
modiﬁed the notice requirements for the introduction of prior acts under
Rule 404(b).22 A 2019 amendment clariﬁed the application of the residual
hearsay exception under Rule 807.23 A 2017 amendment provided an easier
means of authenticating electronic documents under Rule 902.24 Missing,
though, are the broad structural changes and continual systematic
introspection that have historically dominated evidence law.25
One might fairly suggest that there’s a simple explanation for the relative
stability of evidence law under the Federal Rules—perhaps evidence law has
reached its optimum. Perhaps the centuries preceding the codiﬁcation eﬀort
were so fundamentally turbulent precisely because evidence law was in its
infancy. Structural issues in our evidentiary regime have since been
hammered out and, now, only modest ﬁne-tuning is necessary. Thus,
rulemakers’ avoidance of signiﬁcant evidentiary reform is merely the product
of an absence of calls for any further change.
Were only it so. Although evidence law has stagnated over the last half
century, the world around it has continued to evolve. In particular,
developments in both the empirical and normative literatures testify to the
continuing necessity of broad-scale evidentiary reform.26 On the empirical
21 See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., FED. R. EVID., hist. n., at vii-x (Comm.
Print 2021) (providing a history of amendments made to the Federal Rules).
22 FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note to 2020 amendment; see also Memorandum
from Hon. Debra A. Livingston, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Hon. David G.
Campbell, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc., at 2-3 (May 30, 2019) (specifying
details of the 2020 amendment).
23 FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory committee’s note to 2019 amendment; see also Memorandum
from Hon. Debra A. Livingston, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Hon. David G.
Campbell, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc., at 2-4 (May 14, 2018) (specifying
details of the 2019 amendment).
24 FED. R. EVID. 902 advisory committee’s note to 2017 amendment; see also Memorandum
from Hon. William K. Sessions III, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Hon. Jeﬀrey S.
Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc., Tab 6B (Nov. 7, 2015) (specifying details
of the 2017 amendment).
25 See Fisher, supra note 18, at 667-73 (tracking the emergence of evidence rules that permitted
sworn testimony by criminal defendants, civil parties, and nonwhite witnesses); David P. Leonard,
In Defense of the Character Evidence Prohibition: Foundations of the Rule Against Trial by Character,
73 IND. L.J. 1161, 1194-95 (1998) (discussing the historical evolution of evidence law’s treatment
of character evidence).
26 See, e.g., Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88 NW. U.
L. REV. 995, 1039 (1994) (“The theoretical value of social scientiﬁc inquiry to the reform of evidence
law is obvious.”); Timothy R. Rice, Restoring Justice: Purging Evil from Federal Rule of Evidence 609,
89 TEMP. L. REV. 683, 686 (2017) (criticizing Rule 609(a)(1) for stereotyping people with felony
convictions as “evil and unworthy of belief based solely on [their] prior conviction[s]”); see also
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front, studies demonstrate that so-called “folk psychology” pervades the
Federal Rules of Evidence.27 For example, the psychology-based claims
underlying Rule 803(1)’s present sense impression exception, Rule 803(2)’s
excited utterance exception, and Rule 804(b)(2)’s dying declaration exception
face withering empirical challenges.28 Indeed, modern social science
experiments have so thoroughly vitiated the rationales for many rules that
prominent judges have implored rulemakers to “beg[i]n paying attention to
such studies.”29 On the normative front, evolving cultural and moral norms
have rendered other Rules deeply problematic. Take Rule 609, which rests on
the normative assertion that criminal oﬀenders are inherently
untrustworthy.30 Rule 609’s status-based claim about the veracity of those
with previous criminal convictions is oﬀensive, to say the least.31 Rule 606(b),
too, demands reform. By forbidding testimony about the jury’s
decisionmaking process, Rule 606(b)’s no-impeachment rule continues to act
as a shield for prejudice in the deliberation room.32 Few today would suggest
that simply masking animus is an acceptable practice, yet the rule stands
strong. Nevertheless, in the face of these (and more) pressing issues,
rulemakers have been silent. There has been no eﬀort—nor even a
suggestion—to fundamentally reshape evidence law to account for modern

Tamara Lave & Aviva A. Orenstein, Empirical Fallacies of Evidence Law: A Critical Look at the
Admission of Prior Sex Crimes, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 795, 812-29 (2013) (arguing that sexual propensity
rules are not supported by psychological and criminological research); Roger C. Park & Michael J.
Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 957 (2006)
(“[T]he social and natural sciences are increasingly relevant to the law’s attempt to reach accurate verdicts.”).
27 Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 588 (7th Cir. 2004) (describing “the folk psychology of evidence”).
28 See Douglas D. McFarland, Present Sense Impressions Cannot Live in the Past, 28 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 907, 918 (2001) (“[S]ocial science demonstrates that liars fabricate lies with amazing
rapidity . . . .”); Aviva Orenstein, Her Last Words: Dying Declarations and Modern Confrontation
Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1411, 1413 (describing Rule 804(b)(2)’s dying declaration exception
as the “laughing stock of hearsay exceptions”); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 272, at 366 (Kenneth
S. Broun, ed., 7th ed. 2013) (“The entire basis for the [excited utterance] exception may . . . be questioned.”).
29 Lust, 383 F.3d at 588.
30 See Teree E. Foster, Rule 609(a) in the Civil Context: A Recommendation for Reform, 57 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1, 5 (1988) (“Rule 609 is the product of the law’s long-standing and dogmatic assumptions that
criminal convictions reflect character, and that character determines veracity.”).
31 See Montré D. Carodine, “The Mis-Characterization of the Negro”: A Race Critique of the Prior
Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 527 (2009) (“Rule 609 is indeed problematic for
defendants . . . . [A] recent empirical study establish[ed] that a substantial number of convicted
felons, later determined to have been actually innocent, decided not to testify at their trials for fear
that they would be impeached with their prior convictions.”); Daniel D. Blinka, The Modern Trial
and Evidence Law: Has the “Rambling Altercation” Become A Pedantic Joust?, 47 GA. L. REV. 665, 688
(2013) [hereinafter Blinka, The Modern Trial] (describing how trial lawyers use Rule 609 to share
“unsavory facts” about an opposing party with the jury).
32 See Taariq Lewis, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado and the Racial Animus Exception to the NoImpeachment Rule: Extending an Exception to Suspect Classes That Experience Pervasive Bias in the Jury
System, 72 FLA. L. REV. 1353, 1374 (2020) (arguing that Rule 606(b) permits pervasive anti-LGBTQ bias).
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understandings. To borrow the words of fellow commentators, rulemakers
have instead chosen an “inherently conservative” approach, expressing a
simple aﬃnity for the general status quo.33
So, then, is evidence law dead? Are we resigned to a frozen regime that
exclusively sees amending authority placed in the hands of rulemakers
unable or unwilling to employ it?
Perhaps not. There’s nothing new under the sun, and that applies, too, to
positive law. Evidence law is not unique in having to navigate a stubborn
positivist regime. Rather, the successes (and failures) of reform measures in
cognate contexts point the path ahead for evidence law. That path begins with
a turn toward jurisprudential theory.
Where a doctrinal space concurrently faces a pressing need for both
positivist compliance and substantive evolution, reformers can strike an ideal
balance by encouraging judicial adoption of a loosely-Dworkinian
interpretive model that comparatively weighs two variables: “ﬁdelity” and
“justiﬁability.”34 That is, judges can achieve desirable change by pinpointing
an application of the law that expresses suﬃcient fidelity to existing legal
source material while also constituting the most normatively or empirically
justifiable outcome within that permissible range. Legal outcomes remain
constrained due to the requirement that judges remain adequately faithful to
controlling law, but within that often-broad boundary, judges have signiﬁcant
latitude to best shape the law in light of external realities.
Though facially amorphous, bespoke fashioning of “ﬁdelity” and
“justiﬁability” underlies immense reform eﬀorts in frozen doctrinal spaces
akin to evidence law. For example, in the burgeoning interpretive approach
of “living constitutionalism,” we see reformers uniquely molding elements of
the bivariant model to revivify constitutional law.35 Undaunted by Article V’s
functionally inoperable amendment process, living constitutionalists see
progressive judicial interpretation as a primary mechanism for eﬀecting

Teter, supra note 4, at 160.
Notably, this Article’s employment of “ﬁdelity” and “justiﬁability” most closely echoes
Ronald Dworkin’s “law as integrity” interpretive approach, which employs “ﬁt” and “justiﬁcation”
to pinpoint (what Dworkin believes to be) correct outcomes in common law settings. RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 139, 230-32 (1987). Though Dworkin’s model helps inform this Article’s
model, the trained eye will spot many diﬀerences between “law as integrity” and living evidentiary
theory. Id. at 225; see infra Part I.
35 See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 1-5 (2010) [hereinafter, STRAUSS,
THE LIVING CONSTITUTION] (presenting a theory of constitutional law that allows “both a static
written constitution and a dynamic living constitution in the same system”); see also David A. Strauss,
Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (2015) (describing a theory
of constitutional law that is a “mixed system” of static text and shifting common law).
33
34
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constitutional change.36 In technical terms, living constitutionalism
recognizes that any interpretation of the nation’s founding document must
express suﬃcient ﬁdelity to its text or purpose, but that ﬁdelity assessment
is coupled with an equal (or perhaps even primary) desire to modernize the
Constitution’s substance.37 Through idiosyncratic application of the bivariant
model, then, constitutional law is made new. So too are “ﬁdelity” and
“justiﬁability” implicit in Judge Guido Calabresi’s seminal framework for the
renewal of frozen statutory regimes.38 When facing dilapidated positivist
landscapes, the former Yale Law School dean’s inﬂuential theory encourages
judges to invalidate obsolete statutes rather than give rote application to
outmoded or problematic provisions.39 The thesis calls for judicial
intervention where no suﬃciently faithful interpretation of an anachronistic
statutory regime remains normatively justiﬁable.40 And again, through
judicial intercession, change comes to lethargic doctrinal spaces.
The circumstances that led to the initial emergence of both living
constitutionalism and statutory invalidation theory now echo in evidence law.
The positivist turn that culminated in the codiﬁcation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence has led evidence law into a period of stagnancy; broad, structural
evidentiary reform seems all but impossible. But courts have long recognized
that our “federal system of evidence . . . is not to remain in straitjacket, static
and unchangeable.”41 Perhaps evidence law’s solution, therefore, is to follow
in the footsteps of kindred reform eﬀorts.
This Article thus advocates in favor of a novel jurisprudential posture
toward the Federal Rules of Evidence—one that seeks to awaken evidence law
from its judicially-monikered “dogmatic slumber.”42 Running parallel to
aspects of both living constitutionalism and statutory invalidation theory,
living evidentiary theory uniquely contours “ﬁdelity” and “justiﬁability” to
evidence law. It operationalizes the theoretical variables in a manner that
promises tangible, material rejuvenation of evidence law’s substantive

36 STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 35, at 116 (“[T]he Constitution has
more resources, besides Article V, to renew and adapt itself, resources that include the precedents
and traditions of the living Constitution.”).
37 See Jack M. Balkin, The Roots of the Living Constitution, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1129, 1133 (2012)
(“[Living constitutionalism] is ﬂexible but not lawless, adaptable to circumstance yet constrained by
long tradition. “It protects fundamental rights from transient public opinion and adapts to changing
times without becoming a plaything of the judges.”).
38 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 163-66 (1982).
39 Id.
40 See id. at 164 (“It is the judgmental function . . . of deciding when a rule has come to be
suﬃciently out of phase with the whole legal framework so that, whatever its age, it can only stand
if a current majoritarian or representative body reaﬃrms it.”).
41 United States v. 60.14 Acres of Land, 362 F.2d 660, 666 (3d Cir. 1966).
42 United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 801 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., concurring).
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evolution. Namely, in making evidentiary determinations, living evidentiary
theory encourages a judge to couple her reliance on the text and purpose of
the Federal Rules of Evidence with equally forceful appreciation for external
realities discerned from modern cultural sentiments and the leading edge of
the scientiﬁc and empirical literatures. The model therefore pushes judges to
move beyond a singular obsession with “ﬁdelity”—a limited interpretive
approach that has stymied evidence law for the past half century—and instead
couple that ﬁdelity assessment with deep appreciation of how to apply the
Federal Rules of Evidence in the most normatively justiﬁable fashion.
Representative examples help illustrate living evidentiary theory’s
substantial reform potential. Turning ﬁrst to scientiﬁc and empirical reform,
consider how a judge employing living evidentiary theory might reconsider
interpretation and application of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2).
Introduced above, the excited utterance exception allows hearsay into the
courtroom if, inter alia, the statement was made when the declarant was under
the shock of a startling event.43 Legislative history makes clear that the
prevailing rationale for the excited utterance exception at the time of its
enactment was a psychology-based belief that statements made under
stressful, even panicked, conditions are inherently trustworthy; declarants in
that state will be unable to fabricate eﬀectively.44 But modern scientiﬁc
literature demonstrates that statements made under duress are often less
reliable, not more.45 Nevertheless, in applying 803(2), courts—prioritizing
“ﬁdelity”—have narrowly looked to the language of the rule when
determining whether to admit or exclude an exclamation;46 there has been
little judicial inspection of the withering scientiﬁc and empirical support for
the exception. Living evidentiary theory, though, calls on a judge to dive
deeper. Since text and purpose—the notion of “ﬁdelity”—no longer exhaust
the requisite interpretive analysis, the model also calls for a judge to turn her
FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee’s note to 1975 proposed rules (“The theory of
[803(2)] is simply that circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills
the capacity of reﬂection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication.”); United States v.
Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 127 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The rationale for [803(2)] is that the excitement of the event
limits the declarant’s capacity to fabricate a statement and thereby offers some guarantee of its reliability.”).
45 See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 28, § 272, at 366 (“While psychologists would
probably concede that excitement minimizes the possibility of reﬂective self-interest inﬂuencing the
declarant’s statements, they have questioned whether this might be outweighed by the distorting
eﬀect of shock and excitement upon the declarant’s observation and judgement.”); see also Steven
Baicker-McKee, The Excited Utterance Paradox, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 111, 131-75 (2017) (explaining
that statements made under excitement may still be unreliable).
46 See Glen Weissenberger, Evidence Myopia: The Failure to See the Federal Rules of Evidence as a
Codification of the Common Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1539, 1592 (1999) [hereinafter
Weissenberger, Evidence Myopia] (“[S]trict textualism in the interpretation and construction of the
Federal Rules of Evidence inevitably will result in the ossiﬁcation of the law of evidence . . . .”).
43
44
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attention to the scientiﬁc and empirical literature to determine the most
“justiﬁable” application of the excited utterance exception. And there, a
weighing of both ﬁdelity and justiﬁability reveals a number of superior
approaches for administration of the excited utterance exception. For
instance, one improved method of applying the excited utterance exception is
to require that proponents offer proof not only satisfying the Rule’s enshrined
elements but also affirmatively demonstrating reliability, perhaps by directly
addressing the contrary scientific consensus. This “living” approach still
expresses fidelity to Rule 803(2). It still is faithful to the existing code, albeit in
a purposivist sense. But, when sifting among the competing approaches to
interpreting and applying Rule 803(2), the living model is most defensible
given its ability to align evidence law with best empirical understandings.
Rather than turning a blind eye to folk psychology in our evidentiary regime,
living evidentiary theory channels evidence law to a better form.
As suggested above, though, living evidentiary theory does not solely
premise reform on improved empirical and scientiﬁc understandings; rather,
it also seeks to align evidence law with modern cultural sentiments and
evolving standards of decency. Consider, as one of many potential examples,
how this Article’s interpretive model can improve application of Federal Rule
of Evidence 606(b) in the courtroom, particularly in light of an urgent
national awakening to the invidious ills of structural and systematic
discrimination. Generally stated, Rule 606(b) prevents a juror from testifying
about the validity of the jury’s decisionmaking process.47 Predictably, staunch
protection of the deliberation room has had deleterious eﬀects. For instance,
a recalcitrant juror cannot testify that a jury completely ignored the judge’s
instructions, or that it otherwise convicted a defendant on some legally
irrelevant basis.48 She can’t testify that the jury spent the entirety of a trial
intoxicated.49 As far as Rule 606(b) is concerned, she can’t even testify that
discriminatory prejudice served as the basis of a jury’s verdict.50 In application,
then, Rule 606(b) has proven immensely problematic. In addressing animus,
it aims to simply conceal rather than confront it. Without question, that
approach is far afield of prevailing moral and cultural norms. But, again, living
FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
See, e.g., United States v. Ewing, 749 F. App’x 317, 322 (6th Cir. 2018) (“A juror’s statement
suggesting that the jury misunderstood or misapplied instructions or the law is also typically
considered internal and therefore subject to Rule 606(b)’s bar.”).
49 See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120-22 (1987) (holding that a juror is barred from
testifying to drug or alcohol use among jurors by 606(b)).
50 Notably, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado created a small exception to the no-impeachment rule,
allowing jurors to testify that racial animus infected the deliberation room. 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
But, after giving Rule 606(b) a narrow reading, the Supreme Court had to turn to constitutional
reasoning to establish the narrow exception. Id. at 867-68. Rule 606(b) itself thus oﬀers little
protection against jury animus and prejudice.
47
48
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evidentiary theory promises change. Given the Rules’ substantive stagnation,
an interpreter should couple “fidelity” with “justifiability” to pinpoint which
application of Rule 606(b) is sufficiently faithful to the rule and most
normatively defensible. When viewed through that holistic prism, there can
be little question that Rule 606(b)’s exceptions should be read expansively to
combat prejudice and misconduct in the deliberation room. Far from usurping
Rule 606(b), then, living evidentiary theory gives the rule its best form. It
enables a pathway for substantive improvement in our evidence code—
improvement currently foreclosed by rulemakers’ silence.
It’s not difficult to imagine the analysis visible in the preceding two
examples inspiring widespread change across the existing evidentiary regime.
In addition to the excited utterance exception, the present sense impression
exception and the dying declaration exception immediately come under
scrutiny given their own questionable psychological underpinnings.51 So, too,
does Rule 609—perhaps the most controversial rule of all—face immediate
reform potential given concordant evolving cultural perceptions regarding the
veracity of criminal offenders.52 Rule 404(b)’s backdoor for propensity evidence
could be significantly narrowed;53 Rules 401 and 403’s relevance framework,
which can work to exclude evidence of generalized structural discrimination,
could be significantly broadened.54 In a dead evidentiary regime, these reforms
seem impractical; through living evidentiary theory, they become inevitable.
Thus, this Article’s framework kicks evidence law back into life. It
ameliorates the stagnation brought on by the enactment of the Federal Rules
and restores the natural progression and evolution of evidence doctrine.
Handing judges the spearhead of transformational evidentiary change
recalibrates institutional incentives. It enables judges to optimize evidentiary
practices in their courtrooms, while also retaining rulemakers’ ultimate
51 See McFarland, supra note 28, at 918 (“[S]ocial science demonstrates that liars fabricate lies
with amazing rapidity.”); Orenstein, supra note 28, at 1413 (describing Rule 804(b)(2)’s dying
declaration exception as the “laughing stock of hearsay exceptions”).
52 See Carodine, supra note 31, at 527 (“Rule 609 is indeed problematic for defendants . . .
recent empirical study establishing that a substantial number of convicted felons, later determined
to have been actually innocent, decided not to testify at their trials for fear that they would be
impeached with their prior convictions.”).
53 See Paul S. Milich, The Degrading Character Rule in American Criminal Trials, 47 GA. L. REV.
775, 777 (2013) (“[T]he most critical and problematic part of the character rule [has been] the
admission of the criminal defendant’s past crimes and other acts under rule 404(b).”); see also Rachel
Moran, Contesting Police Credibility, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1339, 1359 (2018) (explaining how the res
gestae doctrine, which is theoretically intended to “serve as a narrow means of admitting evidence
related to the charged case, . . . has too often been employed as an end-run around what little
protections 404(b) may provide to defendants.”).
54 See Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Toward a Critical Race Theory of Evidence, 101 MINN. L. REV.
2243, 2303 (2017) (describing how critical race analytical tools can be used to evaluate the
admissibility of evidence).
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authority to maintain a uniform code by endorsing certain judicial
innovations and drawing back others.
The pages below therefore introduce, explain, and defend living
evidentiary theory.
Immediately following this Introduction, Part I seeks to set the stage.
First, it traces the history of evidence law in both the United States and
England. This broad survey demonstrates the inherent turbulence that
pervaded evidence law prior to the codiﬁcation eﬀort. Fundamental
evidentiary change aﬀecting the very nature of adjudication itself was
relatively commonplace; longevity wasn’t a hallmark of any early evidentiary
regime. Yet early realignments in evidence law were, by modern standards,
normatively desirable. The system wasn’t simply changing for the sake of
changing; instead, history reveals evidence law’s long legacy of reinventing
itself to discern truth more accurately and better conform factﬁnding to
evolving standards of decency.55 Part I then introduces the Federal Rules of
Evidence. It demonstrates that the positivist movement that culminated in
the codiﬁcation of evidence law eﬀectively froze evidence law in time.
Despite the historical doctrinal turbulence, the process for amending the
Federal Rules of Evidence is cumbersome. And, indeed, evidence law has
largely stagnated for the last half century.
Part II offers this Article’s major intervention. It begins by introducing
and explaining living evidentiary theory, a jurisprudential framework that
encourages judges to holistically consider text, purpose, and modern empirical
and normative understandings when constructing, interpreting, and applying
the Federal Rules of Evidence. More broadly, living evidentiary theory offers
a way forward for the structural progression of evidence law. In explaining the
framework, Part II also considers potential objections, including those from a
political, practical, and legal process perspective. Part II then details the
immense reform potential of living evidentiary theory. The framework has the
potential to reinvigorate a dormant doctrinal space. Once adopted, evidence
law can again resume its historic progression towards a more empirically
sound, culturally accepted system of rules. Following that account, the final
part offers a brief conclusion.
I. TOWARD A CODIFIED EVIDENTIARY REGIME
Despite its prominent place in the American juridical landscape today, the
Federal Rules of Evidence constituted a rather anomalous intervention at the
time of their enactment. This is not to say that codification is unique to
55 Cf. Blinka, The Modern Trial, supra note 31, at 667-73 (tracing the rise of the modern
evidentiary system in the United States).
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evidence law, nor even that the Federal Rules of Evidence were at the forefront
of the twentieth century’s broader codification movement.56 Rather, it’s a
recognition that the creation of an affirmative evidentiary code constituted a
tectonic shift—a fundamental departure—from the centuries-old process by
which courts previously regulated and improved our evidentiary regime.57
Historically, evidence law was largely a creature of the judiciary. Common
law jurisprudence served as the driving force behind evidentiary
progression.58 Even as a positivist movement began to swell in the country a
century ago, evidence law was initially seen as beyond the reach of
codiﬁcation.59 For instance, despite receiving the formal authority to draft a
controlling evidentiary code from the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
stakeholders and the Supreme Court were initially in “no mood to tinker with
the law of evidence.”60 Instead, the common law progression of evidence law
would continue. But that sentiment, of course, did not hold for long. The
initial resistance to the evidence codiﬁcation movement eventually gave way
to ever-increasing calls for a uniform repository of evidence rules. And,
indeed, the installation of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 marked the
death knell of evidence law’s jurisprudential progression.61
If the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence merely transferred the
historic evolution of evidence law from judicial channels to more
administrative avenues of change, there would be little reason for complaint.
Capturing the progression of our evidentiary regime in a single controlling
code can oﬀer material normative gains by improving uniformity and
transparency across jurisdictions.62
56 Dru Stevenson, Costs of Codification, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1129, 1130 (“[M]odern codes are the
product of the codification movement, which came in three waves in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. In earlier periods, legislation appeared in chronological form in official publications.”).
57 Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307, 1339 (1992) (detailing the “common-law heritage” of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
58 Weissenberger, Insights from Article VI, supra note 19, at 1617 (“[T]he exercise of inherent judicial
powers that have been historically integral to the forward evolution of the common law of evidence.”).
59 David P. Leonard, Foreword: Twenty Years of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1251, 1251 (1995) (“Prior to 1975 only a few states had codiﬁed their evidence rules; today, only a
handful have not.”).
60 Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing “The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking”, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 843,
846-47 (2002). See 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5002 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing the various forces that led to nearly
forty years of stagnancy between the passing of the Rules Enabling Act and the eventual drafting of
the Federal Rules of Evidence).
61 Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 416 (arguing that the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence
constituted a perpetual “challenge [to] the traditional, common-law judicial hegemony over evidence law”).
62 Paul F. Kirgis, A Legisprudential Analysis of Evidence Codification: Why Most Rules of Evidence
Should Not Be Codified—but Privilege Law Should Be, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 809, 817 (2004) (“Most
of the scholarly literature discussing the history of the Federal Rules of Evidence also stresses those
dual objectives of uniformity and improvement of the law of evidence.”).
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But the turn to a positivist evidentiary regime has given rise to a more
insidious consequence. Rather than merely redirecting the channels of
evidentiary evolution in the United States, the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence has seemingly foreclosed the possibility of material change
to our evidentiary regime altogether. In the half century since the federal
evidence code emerged, rulemakers have entertained only modest amendments
to the Federal Rules, simply fine-tuning the same system installed in the
1970s.63 Fundamental change to our evidentiary regime, change designed to
ensure that evidence law accords with best empirical understandings and
evolving standards of decency, has become all but impracticable.64
The pages below therefore explore the demise of evidence law. The
Section begins its journey by turning back the clock and tracing the
development of our evidentiary regime through the centuries. The history of
evidence law reveals a once-dynamic ﬁeld, one marked by numerous
fundamental realignments designed to better ensure that evidence law
achieves its twin normative aims of accurate verdicts and legitimate trials.65
In seeking continual reinvention, our evidentiary regime has thus been quite
turbulent. Longstanding stability and consistency certainly have not been
historic hallmarks of evidence law. That is, until the Federal Rules of
Evidence emerged. This Section therefore complements its exploration of
evidence law’s common law roots with an equally deep dive into the social,
legal, and jurisprudential factors that led to the enshrinement of an
aﬃrmative evidence code. It details how the Federal Rules of Evidence
reassigned decisionmaking authority over evidence law’s progression from
judges to rulemakers. And, ultimately, it considers how the Federal Rules have
stiﬂed the traditional progressive developments that were once a hallmark of
the evidence doctrinal space.
A. Evidence Law’s Origins
Somewhat surprisingly, evidence law had relatively little signiﬁcance until
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.66 However, given the institutional
Teter, supra note 4, at 160 (“The evidentiary rulemaking process is inherently conservative.”).
Symposium, The Politics of (Evidence) Rulemaking, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 733, 739 (2002)
(describing the pursuit of amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence as “a time consuming, very
slow process”).
65 See generally Langbein, supra note 9, at 1173 (tracing the development of evidence law in the
United States); WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 60, at § 5001 (detailing the historical evolution of
law from 1789 to 1938).
66 Noted scholar John Henry Wigmore would disagree on this point, marking the rise of
evidence law in the late-sixteenth, early-seventeenth centuries; John Langbein, however, has argued
that “even into the middle of the eighteenth century, the modern law of evidence was not yet in
operation.” See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
63
64
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structure of the early jury, the late arrival of a robust evidentiary regime
perhaps make sense. After all, in its initial form, the jury was a completely
diﬀerent legal entity than its modern descendant. First emerging in the
twelfth century,67 the early jury was primarily a prosecutorial and inquisitorial
body.68 Early juries were not expected to serve as passive evaluators of
contested facts; quite the opposite. Instead, given the sociocultural landscape
of Medieval England, comprised of tight-knit agrarian communities, juries
were expected to have intimate pre-knowledge about the facts at issue in a
case.69 Initially, juries were comprised of those individuals with the most
background knowledge about a particular event.70 It is therefore not diﬃcult
to see why evidence law had little role to play in the early era. Evidence law
generally seeks to control that information which comes before a factfinder.71
It serves a gatekeeping function so as to properly tee up the contours of a
factual dispute. In the early era, in contrast, the jury’s pre-knowledge and
quasi-prosecutorial function necessarily rendered any evidentiary restrictions
moot. Simply stated, the system “had hardly any place for a law of evidence.”72
Fundamental change occurred on the wings of a pandemic. The ﬁfteenth
century’s “Black Death” crushed the agrarian sociocultural model that thereto
served as a necessary predicate for self-informing juries.73 As open ﬁelds
agriculture became nonviable and communal life within small villages faded
away, the early legal system’s ability to rely on intimate local pre-knowledge
67 The ﬁrst jury initially emerged after the infamous ordeal ceased to constitute a legitimate
dispute resolution tool in the twelfth century. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF
REASONABLE DOUBT 7 (2008) (“Historians have long recognized that jury trial ﬁrst emerged as an
alternative to the judicial ordeal.”); Matthew P. Harrington, The Economic Origins of the Seventh
Amendment, 87 IOWA L. REV. 145, 155 (2001) (“The jury was a well-established feature of the English
judicial system long before the first American colonies were established. Although the earliest juries
may have performed an administrative function, it is clear that by the twelfth century, juries came to
operate as a dispute resolution mechanism, supplanting the older forms of trial by ordeal or battle.”).
68 The Assize of Clarendon I (1166), reprinted in 2 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS: 1042–
1189, at 440-43 (David C. Douglas & George W. Greenaway eds., 2d ed. 1981).
69 See Edward K. Cheng & G. Alexander Nunn, Beyond the Witness: Bringing A Process
Perspective to Modern Evidence Law, 97 TEXAS L. REV. 1077, 1084 (2019) (“The early jury was a selfinformed group, as jurors’ place in tightknit agrarian communities enabled them to have intimate
knowledge about relevant trial facts or, at a minimum, put jurors in the best position to uncover the
necessary facts.”); see also Langbein, supra note 9, at 1170-71.
70 See Cheng & Nunn, supra note 69.
71 See Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and the Critique of Evidence Theory, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1551, 1555-56 (2001) (explaining how evidence law seeks to prevent jury error by ﬁltering out
evidence that is likely to lead a jury astray).
72 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 660 (2d ed. Cambridge 1898).
73 See Cheng & Nunn, supra note 69, at 1084-85 (describing how the Black Death changed
ﬁfteenth-century English society); JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P.
SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 224-27 (2009).
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to adjudicate claims largely evaporated. “Without the village, the jury, as
contemporaries knew it, would have been impossible.”74 But institutional
evolution prevented obsolescence. In the decades following the Black Death,
the English adjudicatory system radically reinvented itself. For the ﬁrst time,
juries began to assume a familiar role not as a self-informing prosecutor but
instead as a passive evaluator of factual disputes.75 Juror pre-knowledge
became increasingly uncommon and, therefore, third-party testimony in the
courtroom rose to the fore.76 “The jury came to resemble the panel that we
recognize in modern practice, a group of citizens no longer chosen for their
knowledge of the events, but rather chosen in the expectation that they
would be ignorant of the events.”77
As jurors began to settle into their new passive role, evidence law (slowly)
began to emerge.78 That is, when the jury began to serve solely an evaluative
function, there started to emerge an apparatus of regulations concerning what
information could or should constitute the basis of the jury’s decisions.79
Some of these emerging regulations aimed to increase information ﬂow to
the jury. The Marian Committal Statue of 1555, for instance, aﬀorded early
prosecutors a means by which to force witnesses to court to testify.80
Conversely, however, a robust system of rules seeking to prohibit certain
types of evidence from the courtroom was much slower in its arrival.81
Increasingly, though, as the jury settled into its evaluative role, “the
opportunity arose for the judge to regulate the trial testimony of witnesses,”
leading to some of the ﬁrst formal rules of evidence.82
The emergence of additional evidentiary restrictions followed and,
certainly by the turn of the nineteenth century, evidence law had arrived.83
74 R.B. Goheen, Peasant Politics? Village Community and the Crown in Fifteenth-Century England,
96 AM. HIST. REV. 42, 53 (1991).
75 See THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 112-14 (Mary Dewar ed., 1982)
(demonstrating the emergence of the jury’s passive role); accord JOHN LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS
OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 13 (2003).
76 LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 73, 238-48.
77 Langbein, supra note 9, at 1171.
78 See id. (“Instructional jury trial made the law of evidence possible.”).
79 John H. Wigmore, A General Survey of the History of the Rules of Evidence, in 2 SELECT
ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 691, 692-93 (Ass’n Am. L. Schs. ed. 1908) (“By
the 1500s, the constant employment of witnesses, as the jury’s chief source of information, brings
about a radical change . . . . With all the emphasis gradually cast upon the witnesses, their words
and their documents, the whole question of admissibility arises.”).
80 LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 73, at 51; John H. Langbein, The Privilege and Common Law
Criminal Procedure: The Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 82, 91 (Helmholz et al. eds., 1997).
81 Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165,
168 (2006) (“Interestingly, the entire law of evidence is a relatively modern creation.”).
82 Langbein, supra note 9, at 1171.
83 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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By that point, evidence scholar John Henry Wigmore noted the existence of
“a general and settled acceptance of [the hearsay] rule as a fundamental part
of the law.”84 Also in place by then was an emphasis on ensuring the validity
of documentary evidence—a requirement now known as the “best evidence
rule.” Geoﬀrey Gilbert’s eighteenth-century evidence treatise, for example,
exhibits an outsized focus on the best evidence rule, seeking to ensure that
claims concerning written evidence were supported by original
documentation.85 Moreover, by this point, there had also emerged evidentiary
restrictions around testimony from interested witnesses.86 Fearing that
interested witnesses might perjure themselves—an outcome seen as anathema
in an era of witness reliability structured around the oath—evidence law
simply prevented interested witness sworn testimony altogether.87
Ultimately, though decentralized, a tangible corpus of evidence doctrine had
come to exist in English and American courts.
Perhaps the most striking feature accompanying the emergence of
evidence law is the rate at which the doctrinal space fundamentally reinvented
itself. In the centuries before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
for instance, radical transformations in evidence law continually reshaped
adjudication in the United States.
For example, evidence law’s primary emphasis for evaluating witness
credibility materially transformed in just the two centuries before the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.88 As originally constituted,
evidence law relied heavily on the oath to ensure witness trustworthiness.89
Evidentiary restrictions arose, therefore, to protect the centrality of the oath.
Credibility contests, which could reveal weaknesses in an oath-based system,
were disallowed. “The oath’s central role demanded that the system avoid
sworn credibility conﬂicts, because any such conﬂict would reveal in a visible

84 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1364, at 26 (3d ed. 1940).
85 See GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: BY A LATE LEARNED JUDGE 73-76,

78-79, 95 (London, Henry Lintot 1756) (discussing, inter alia, proofs of wills, ledgers, court rolls,
registers, and deeds); William Twining, What Is the Law of Evidence?, in RETHINKING EVIDENCE:
EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 178, 188 (1990) (“Gilbert tried to subsume all the rules of evidence under a
single principle, the ‘best evidence rule.’”); see also Langbein, supra note 9, at 1173.
86 See Fisher, supra note 18, at 624-27, 630 (describing the importance of limiting rules as a
means of ensuring the strength of the oath that continued well into the nineteenth century).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 580-82.
89 Id. at 580 (“In the early years of the criminal trial jury, the system sought to stake its claim
to legitimacy primarily in the oath and in the perceived divine power of the oath to compel truthful
testimony.”); Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie Detection, and
Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191, 1194 (2010) (“Historically, the law relied on the oath to serve the
truth-warranting function.”).
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and obvious way the oath’s inadequacy to assure truthful testimony.”90 Thus,
until a century and a half ago, prevailing evidence doctrine restricted jurors
from hearing competing sworn testimony. Instead, those deemed most
likely—or most tempted—to fabricate were simply barred from testifying
under oath. Civil parties could not oﬀer sworn testimony.91 Accused criminals
could not oﬀer sworn testimony. 92 Even witnesses in felony cases called on
behalf of the accused could not oﬀer sworn testimony.93
In the century preceding the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
however, radical change swept through evidence law, fundamentally
transforming the contours of adjudication in the United States.94 Crossexamination, rather than the oath, increasingly earned a perception as the
“greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”95 And, as
empirical and cultural understandings evolved, so too did evidence law.
Between 1846 and 1848, Michigan and Connecticut became the ﬁrst states to
allow interested parties to testify in civil trials—and in the years subsequent,
many other states followed suit.96 In 1864, just 111 years before the
enshrinement of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Maine pioneered evidentiary
reform by becoming the ﬁrst jurisdiction to give criminal defendants the right
to oﬀer sworn testimony on their own behalf.97 As with the evidentiary
change in the civil context, several states followed Maine’s lead.98
Momentarily stepping back to take stock, a modern criminal trial that fails
to aﬀord the defendant a right to oﬀer sworn testimony on her own behalf,
or even to call sworn witnesses in her defense, seems inconceivable. By
today’s standards, those are fundamental rights that strike at the heart of due
process and fair adjudication.99 Yet just a century before the enactment of the
Fisher, supra note 18, at 580.
See id.
Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 192-93 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“At the time of the
founding, English and American courts strongly encouraged defendants to give unsworn statements
and drew adverse inferences when they failed to do so.”).
93 See Fisher, supra note 18, at 604.
94 Langbein, supra note 9, at 1194 (“The modern law of evidence, centered on the oral testimony
of witnesses at trial, supplanted the older law at the end of the eighteenth century and across the
nineteenth century.”).
95 WIGMORE, supra note 84, § 1367 at 29.
96 See Fisher, supra note 18, at 659 (“Michigan became the ﬁrst state to permit interested
witnesses to testify in 1846 and Connecticut the ﬁrst to admit civil parties in 1848.”).
97 Id. at 584 (“In 1864, the unlikely state of Maine became the world’s ﬁrst common law
jurisdiction to take this transformative step, and a host of mainly Northern states followed.”).
98 See id. at 696-97 (“[O]f the nineteen state and territorial legislatures that acted during the
1870s to grant criminal defendants the right to testify, none belonged to the old Confederacy, and
only two were border states. Not until the 1880s did the Old South begin to fall in line.”).
99 See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987) (“[A]n accused’s right to present his own
version of events in his own words” is “[e]ven more fundamental to a personal defense than the
right of self-representation.”).
90
91
92
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Federal Rules of Evidence—just a century before evidence law was frozen in
time—trial practice and procedure was fundamentally diﬀerent. Advocates
were not merely ﬁne-tuning a stable regime that largely resembled what
would become the Federal Rules of Evidence; rather, they were insisting that
sworn testimony from defendants (again, by modern understandings, a
fundamental feature of trial) would result in a “habitual spectacle of . . .
wholesale perjury.”100 Needless to say, in the century before codiﬁcation,
evidence law was far from static.
Of course, fundamental changes to the nature of evidence law were not
conﬁned to the context of witness credibility. Signiﬁcant reforms also
targeted the very epistemological structure of American trials. Until the early
nineteenth century, for instance, trials embraced a much more inquisitorial
approach to factﬁnding.101 It was common for judges to comment on the
weight of the evidence and suggest an appropriate outcome to the jury. 102 By
modern standards, judicial intervention abridging the jury’s factﬁnding role
is anathema. But it wasn’t until 1795 when North Carolina became the ﬁrst
jurisdiction to forbid trial judges from commenting on the merits of a case.103
And although widespread evidentiary reform soon began to emphasize and
support the familiar adversarial factﬁnding model, many states continued to
allow judicial comment on evidence until as late as 1864.104 Again, by modern
standards, inquisitorial factﬁnding at trial is largely unthinkable; yet it was
the norm in the century before the arrival of the Federal Rules.
Evidence law’s modern ﬁxation on character evidence, too, constitutes a
relatively recent evolution within our evidentiary regime. John Henry
Wigmore wrote that “[h]istorically, the use of bad general character appears
as originally allowable—ﬁtting, as it does, a more primitive notion of human
nature. In England, it was used without question down to the latter part of
the 1700s . . . .”105 In the United States, it took until the nineteenth century
100 Joel N. Bodansky, The Abolition of the Party-Witness Disqualification: An Historical Survey,
70 KY. L.J. 91, 190 n.74 (1981).
101 Langbein, supra note 9, at 1171.
102 See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933) (noting that, historically, judges
could oﬀer the jury “a great light and assistance by his weighing the evidence before them, and
observing where the question and knot of the business lies, and by showing them his opinion even
in matters of fact; which is a great advantage and light to laymen”); Emily Wheeler, The
Constitutional Right to A Trial Before A Neutral Judge: Federalism Tips the Balance Against State Habeas
Petitioners, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 869 (1985) (“At common law, judges routinely exercised the
powers of summary and comment.”).
103 Fisher, supra note 18, at 670 (“In 1795, North Carolina became the ﬁrst state to forbid trial
judges to comment on the weight of the evidence when charging a jury . . . .”).
104 See id. (“By 1864, every member of the Confederacy had barred judicial comment, as had
three border states and twelve states of the Midwest or West. But in the entire Northeast, only
Massachusetts had followed the trend.”).
105 WIGMORE, supra note 84, § 923, at 1061.
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for there to exist a widespread bar on propensity and character evidence.106
And even then, common law jurisprudence continued to adjust the
regulations and restrictions surrounding character evidence.107
Ultimately, evidence law’s origin story is one marked by radical change.
As empirical and cultural understandings evolved, so too did our evidentiary
regime. And the ability of evidence law to react and progress over time was
not seen as troublesome, but instead as normatively desirable. Just nine years
before the codiﬁcation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, the
Third Circuit declared that the “federal system of evidence . . . is not to
remain in a straitjacket, static and unchangeable.”108 Rather, in evidence law,
continual pursuit of the optimal system of rules is the norm. At least, it was.
B. The Federal Rules of Evidence Emerge
Despite evidence law’s common law roots, historic turbulence, and
fundamental constitutive reinventions, a swelling positivist movement in the
latter half of the nineteenth century brought with it the winds of change.109
The political climate of the time increasingly favored legislative and
administrative aggregations of power. Commentators have noted, for example,
that in “the aftermath of its Watergate battle with the Executive branch,
Congress was jealous and assertive of its powers.”110 Across many substantive
spaces, statutes and codes began displacing decisionmaking authority
previously vested in the judiciary.111 And evidence law was no exception.
Although stakeholders initially predicted that evidence law would
withstand the positivist movement’s calls for codiﬁcation,112 revolution came
amid the sociopolitical turmoil of the 1960s. It was in the early part of that
decade when the Judicial Conference and Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure ﬁrst assembled a Special Committee on Evidence to

106 David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence Prohibition: Foundations of the Rule
Against Trial by Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161, 1170 (1998) (“By the ﬁrst decade of the nineteenth
century, the rule excluding character evidence to prove a person’s conduct was well settled.”).
107 See id. at 1167-72.
108 United States v. 60.14 Acres of Land, 362 F.2d 660, 666 (3d Cir. 1966).
109 See Tamanaha, supra note 2, at 615 (charting the chronology of “historical jurisprudence”
including the shift from a focus on natural law to legal positivism); see also HAYMAN, supra note 2,
at 76-80 (discussing prominent twentieth-century positivists and the distinguishing features of
contemporary positivist theory).
110 Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Brief Defense of the Supreme Court’s Approach to the Interpretation
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 27 IND. L. REV. 267, 279 (1993) (citing RONALD CARLSON, EDWARD
J. IMWINKELRIED & EDWARD J. KIONKA, EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES 21 (3d ed. 1991)).
111 Stevenson, supra note 56, at 1130 (“[M]odern codes are the product of the codiﬁcation
movement, which came in three waves in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”).
112 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 60, § 5002.
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expressly consider a reinvention of evidence law as a codiﬁed regime.113 And
indeed, the Special Committee encouraged the development and adoption of
a uniform code of evidence rules.114 Soon thereafter, Chief Justice Earl
Warren established the ﬁrst Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence.115 The Advisory Committee, in turn, proposed its ﬁrst draft
evidentiary code in 1970.116 Following a series of revisions, the Supreme Court
sent the draft Federal Rules of Evidence to Congress for approval in 1972.117
After two years of its own extensive share of negotiations, revisions, and
substantive adjustments, Congress voted in favor of the evidence code in
1975.118 With a signature from President Gerald Ford in 1975, the Federal
Rules of Evidence became law.119
Without question, the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence was a
positivist triumph. Contrary to centuries of practice, the code seemed to
foreclose longstanding judicial authority to shape and evolve evidence law.120
Rather, rulemakers would hold the key to any evidentiary change. They became
the new gatekeepers. And traversing their new gate is quite the endeavor.
Most (formal) amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence now ﬁnd
their inception in the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence.121 The
Advisory Committee, which is composed of judges, practitioners, and
academics,122 is charged with “carry[ing] on a continuous study of the
operation and eﬀect” of the Federal Rules.123 If the Advisory Committee
supports a particular amendment to the evidentiary code, the game is not yet
over—in fact, the labyrinth has just begun. The proposed amendment is sent
113 Id.; Teter, supra note 4, at 158 (“The ﬁrst signiﬁcant movement toward the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence came in 1961, when the Judicial Conference approved the creation of a
Special Committee on Evidence to examine the desirability of developing a set of evidentiary rules
for the federal courts.”).
114 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 60, § 5006.
115 Id.
116 Id.; Teter, supra note 4, at 158.
117 Order, Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972)
(setting forth the draft rules of Supreme Court); 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a).
118 Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1930 (1975) (codiﬁed as the Federal
Rules of Evidence at 28 U.S.C. app.).
119 Statement on Signing a Bill Establishing Rules of Evidence in Federal Court Proceedings, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 6 (Jan. 3, 1975); see also Weissenberger, Evidence Myopia, supra note 46, at 1569.
120 See Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 416 (“Congress continues to challenge the traditional,
common-law judicial hegemony over evidence law.”).
121 See Daniel J. Capra & Liesa L. Richter, Poetry in Motion: The Federal Rules of Evidence and
Forward Progress as an Imperative, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1873, 1877, 1879-86 (2019) (citing examples of when
the Advisory Committee formally amended a Federal Rule of Evidence).
122 Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik William Delker, Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee: A
Short History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678, 684 n.62 (2000).
123 28 U.S.C. § 331; JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 6-7 (1958); Teter, supra note 4, at 160.
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from the Advisory Committee to the Judicial Conference and Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.124 If it passes muster with the
Judicial Conference, it is then sent to the full Supreme Court.125 Once the
Supreme Court approves of a change, the proposed amendment takes a trip
across First Street to Congress, where both the House and Senate have an
opportunity to review the proposed change, and only once the amendment
survives scrutiny from Congress does it take eﬀect.126
With that foundational understanding of evidence law’s new constitutive
form in place, it’s worthwhile to take a step back for evaluation. To be sure,
in a vacuum, the transition from a common law to a codiﬁed evidentiary
regime might not seem particularly material. One might fairly question
whether labeling the transition “revolutionary” is accurate. And indeed,
theoretically, codiﬁcation of the rules of evidence might be seen not only as
substantively inconsequential but also juridically beneﬁcial. After all, a copy
of the Federal Rules of Evidence in every courtroom ensures that our
evidentiary regime is applied fairly and consistently across jurisdictions.127
But problems have emerged in practice. Fifty years of experience has
revealed that the civil turn in American evidentiary law has, functionally
speaking, resulted in the death of the historic progression of our evidentiary
regime. The Federal Rules’ cumbersome amendment process has largely
foreclosed the possibility of the material change needed to ensure that
evidence law continually accords with best empirical and normative
understandings. In fact, it has had quite the opposite eﬀect. It channels
rulemakers into an “inherently conservative”128 approach that forgoes
signiﬁcant changes in favor of maintenance of the status quo. For instance,
even if rulemakers did deem a particular amendment desirable, the current
bureaucratic maze establishes a de facto three-year process to actualize it.129
Perhaps that long time horizon wouldn’t be too detrimental were rulemakers
willing to traverse it, but that has not been the case. Scholars have recognized
that rulemakers have proven reluctant to tinker with any material aspect of
the modern evidentiary code.130 Instead, likely in recognition of the fact
Scallen, supra note 60, at 863 n.102.
See id. (“[T]here are actually three judicial hurdles for the Advisory Committee . . . the
Standing Committee on Rules and Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference, the Judicial
Conference, and the Supreme Court.”).
126 Teter, supra note 4, at 160(providing a general description of the amendment process).
127 120 CONG. REC. 1413 (1974); WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 60, § 5022 n.66.
128 Teter, supra note 4, at 160.
129 The Politics of (Evidence) Rulemaking, supra note 64, at 739 (describing the pursuit of
amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence as “a time consuming, very slow process”).
130 Paul R. Rice, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence: Tending to the Past and
Pretending for the Future?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 817, 838 (2002) (“Law by committee, particularly through
the bureaucratized process under the Rules Enabling Act, is inherently less responsive and vital . . . .”).
124
125
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that the code is generally achieving its goal of fostering legitimate
adjudication, rulemakers have steered clear of the broad-scale structural
reform that previously dominated the evidence landscape in the centuries
preceding the Federal Rules’ enactment.
Thus, evidence law has become frozen in time. The then-existing
culmination of centuries of evidentiary evolution was enshrined in the 1975
code—a relatively arbitrary point in time, substantively speaking—and
rulemakers have since demonstrated little appetite for continuing the
common law’s progressive evolution of our evidentiary regime.
Importantly, recognizing rulemakers’ reluctance to broadly reform
evidence law is not meant to imply that they have been inactive. Far from it.
Rulemakers have pioneered no less than twenty-nine substantive
amendments to the evidentiary code in the past half century.131
But what close examination of those amendments reveals is that the last
half century’s changes to evidence law have been modest by historical
standards. Those structural changes to our evidentiary regime made even just
a century prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence have all
but disappeared. Recall that just 111 years before the Rules froze evidence law
in time, the American trial was an entirely diﬀerent aﬀair. In many
jurisdictions, defendants could not oﬀer sworn testimony on their own
behalf.132 The oath, not cross-examination, was the courtroom’s primary
truth-seeking tool.133 Even restrictions on character or propensity bars were
relative newcomers.134 It took broad structural changes to transition away
from that outdated form of adjudication.
Consider, too, a modern reference point. Even within the last half century,
those small pockets of evidence law still free from rulemakers’ grasp have
continued to undergo radical reconstitution. Take the Confrontation Clause.
Importantly for our purposes, the Confrontation Clause’s residence within
the Sixth Amendment dictates that its corresponding jurisprudence was
largely unaﬀected by the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Statutes, of course, cannot supersede constitutional provisions. So, while the
codiﬁcation of the Rules largely froze the majority of our evidentiary regime
in place, Confrontation jurisprudence maintained the natural state of judicial

131 See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., FED. R. EVID., hist. n., at vii-x (Comm.
Print 2021).
132 Fisher, supra note 18, at 668-69 (detailing how it took Delaware until 1881 to enact a statute
permitting testimony by civil parties).
133 Schauer, supra note 89, at 1194 (“Historically, the law relied on the oath to serve the
truth-warranting function.”).
134 See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 106, at 1170 n.41 (noting that the case most often cited as the
source of the rule excluding character evidence was decided in 1810).
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ﬂuidity that typiﬁes (portions of) constitutional law.135 And, perhaps as
expected given the historic norm, Confrontation jurisprudence has continued
to fundamentally evolve while the rest of evidence law has stood still. In the
1980s, just ﬁve years after the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts ushered in a jurisprudential
era that conceived of the Confrontation Clause as provision primarily rooted
in principles of reliability.136 That is, the Ohio v. Roberts Court considered
the Confrontation Clause to be a witness-production adjudicatory tool
predominantly designed to improve the reliability of evidence.137 Twentyfour years after Roberts, though, the Supreme Court radically reinvented the
Confrontation Clause. In accordance with the historic spirit of evidence
law, it fundamentally realigned doctrine to square it with (what the Court
perceived as) improved understanding. To wit, the Supreme Court’s 2004
decision in Crawford v. Washington overruled Ohio v. Roberts.138 And notably,
the jurisprudential transformation offered by Crawford was not a minor
recalibration; instead, Crawford entirely reimagined the Confrontation
Clause as a provision centered around legitimacy and fairness principles
rather than reliability.139 Crawford dramatically expanded the exclusionary
scope of the Confrontation Clause, significantly changing the playing field
of criminal adjudication.
Now compare these broad structural changes to the relatively modest
amendments made to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Consider, for example,
recent amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 404. Rule 404 is one of the
more controversial evidentiary rules.140 It allows, in certain situations,
135 Of course, confrontation jurisprudence is not a pure common law regime. After all, it’s
premised on the appropriate interpretation of the Sixth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him . . . .”). But, as is often the case with constitutional interpretation, the broad generalities
housed in the Constitution have yielded a robust jurisprudential literature regarding appropriate
application of the Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 751, 754 (2009) (exploring diﬀerent methodologies of constitutional interpretation).
136 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
137 See Fred O. Smith, Jr., Crawford’s Aftershock: Aligning the Regulation of Nontestimonial Hearsay
with the History and Purposes of the Confrontation Clause, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1497, 1514 (2008) (“Under
the Roberts test, before admitting hearsay statements from witnesses who did not appear at trial, the
state had to demonstrate that the statements were suﬃciently reliable to be admitted.”).
138 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
139 See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores
Confrontation Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5 (2004) (“[T]he [Crawford] Court radically
transformed its doctrine governing the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.”); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 RICH. L. REV. 511, 511 (2005) (“[Crawford] radically changed Confrontation
Clause doctrine”).
140 Dora W. Klein, The (Mis)application of Rule 404(b) Heuristics, 72 U. MIA. L. REV. 706, 709 (2018).
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character and propensity evidence into the courtroom when that evidence is
purportedly oﬀered for a non-propensity rationale.141 But even when oﬀered
for a so-called permissible purpose, the introduction of propensity evidence
requires factﬁnders to engage in nigh-impossible mental gymnastics; it is of
course quite diﬃcult to “unring the bell” and disregard information once it’s
before you.142 Because improper use of propensity evidence has a
disproportionately negative eﬀect on defendants, scholars and activists have
long called for a major structural reformation of Rule 404.143 Yet, despite
those calls for material change, rulemakers have steered clear. Instead,
amendments to Rule 404 have pursued minor adjustments. For instance, a
2000 amendment introduced a “tit for tat rule,”144 expanding the situations in
which prosecutors can introduce character evidence against a defendant.145 A
2006 amendment clariﬁed that general character evidence (as opposed to
speciﬁc acts) is inadmissible in civil cases.146 A more recent 2020 amendment
focused on notice requirements, requiring that an intention to introduce past
acts is broadcast well before trial.147
The amendments outlined above are by no means unimportant. They each
oﬀer necessary improvements or clariﬁcations. But they are also
demonstrative of an aﬃnity for the status quo. Missing from the list of
amendments—and from the list of changes even considered by rulemakers—
is any substantial engagement with the underlying structural issues driving
evidence law. Missing is continual, persistent self-reﬂection as to whether our
current regime is best serving the normative ideals of accuracy and legitimacy.
Missing is any attempt to expressly consider evidence law’s role in falsely
convicting scores of defendants exonerated by the Innocence Movement;148

FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1857, 1864 (2001) (“[S]imple admonitions that instruct the jury to disregard psychologically
compelling but inadmissible testimony . . . . often fail to unring the bell.”).
143 See, e.g., Joan L. Larsen, Of Propensity, Prejudice, and Plain Meaning: The Accused’s Use of
Exculpatory Specific Acts Evidence and the Need to Amend Rule 404(b), 87 NW. U. L. REV. 651, 679
(1993) (“The serious constitutional questions implicated by applying Rule 404(b) to block relevant
defense evidence should inspire reform of the law.”); Rachel Moran, Contesting Police Credibility, 93
WASH. L. REV. 1339, 1393 (2018) (proposing a two-part amendment to the rule).
144 In his classroom, Professor Edward K. Cheng coined the term “tit for tat rule” to describe
the 2000 Amendment to Rule 404(a)(2)(B), which allows prosecutors to demonstrate that a
defendant has the very same character trait he accuses a victim of possessing.
145 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
146 FED. R. EVID. 404(a) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment.
147 FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee’s note to 2020 amendment.
148 See Jeﬀrey Bellin, The Evidence Rules That Convict the Innocent, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 305,
307 (2021) (“A smattering of state laws respond to the revelations of the Innocence Movement in
ways that touch on evidence rules, but these changes serve only to illustrate the absence of a more
comprehensive reckoning for evidence policy.”).
141
142
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or evidence law’s potential to aid victims in the #MeToo era;149 or evidence
law’s place in an urgent national reckoning over race and the justice system.150
Where does all this currently leave evidence law?
Evidence law is, by and large, frozen in time. Of course, it was by no means
a foregone conclusion that the positivist turn culminating in the enactment of
the Federal Rules of Evidence would put an end to evidence law’s progressive
historic evolution. Indeed, one could imagine an active body of rulemakers
continually sifting the empirical and normative literatures as part of a perpetual
introspective effort to optimize our evidentiary regime. Instead, amendments
to the Rules have been rare; structural change has been non-existent.
And so as scientiﬁc and cultural understandings evolve, evidence law
remains stagnant. The status quo reigns supreme.
II. THE LIVING RULES OF EVIDENCE
Hindsight is clarifying. At the outset of any substantial legal project,
unknowns exist. Problems prove invisible. Shortcomings are diﬃcult to
discern. Rather than being able to account for and remedy every ﬂaw ex ante,
necessary revisions within particular legal regimes often only become clear
with the passage of time. It was true of the Constitution.151 It was true of
many statutory regimes.152 And it is true of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Evidence law’s future therefore depends on a return to its past. To bring
evidence law back to life, judges must reassume their historic position at the
forefront of evidentiary change. Although judicial intervention in a positivist
space might seem radical, it’s far from unprecedented. In fact, the move has
seen signiﬁcant success in cognate contexts. So, too, can evidence law beneﬁt
from a more active judiciary.
Thus, the pages below introduce living evidentiary theory, a jurisprudential
approach that encourages judges to take an external, holistic perspective when

149 Cf. Michael Conklin, #MeToo Eﬀects on Juror Decision Making, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE
179, 179-80 (2020) (recognizing that the #MeToo movement represents a fundamental societal shift
that will have tangible eﬀects on the legal system).
150 Cf. Tasnim Motala, “Foreseeable Violence” & Black Lives Matter: How Mckesson Can Stifle a
Movement, 73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 61, 61-62 (2020) (acknowledging an urgent national conversation
around racial justice that will demand renewed consideration of core tenets of our legal system).
151 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 40-41 (1993) (describing different founding
“turning points” in United States history that addressed fundamental problems with the Constitution).
152 See, e.g., Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 312 (2003)
(discussing problems in the statutory regime surrounding criminal sentencing); Jacqueline D.
Lipton & John Tehranian, Derivative Works 2.0: Reconsidering Transformative Use in the Age of
Crowdsourced Creation, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 429 (2015) (discussing “problems with the current
statutory damages regime” in the crowdsourcing and copyright context).
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interpreting and applying the Federal Rules of Evidence.153 In offering a robust
foundation for the framework, the Section seeks to demonstrate that living
evidentiary theory is conceptually sound and normatively desirable. Once
adopted, the interpretive model would see evidence law again resume its historic
progression toward a more empirically-sound, culturally accepted system of rules.
A. What Is Living Evidentiary Theory?
Gridlock is not new to positivism. Rather, it is arguably a deﬁning
feature.154 Evidence law’s present period of stasis is visible in—and maybe
even typical of—other positive law regimes. Outdated constitutional
provisions face no prospect of formal amendment.155 Certain statutory
regimes, even unpopular ones, stand immobile due to the impracticality of
congressional action.156 Even administrative regulations suﬀer from undue
entrenchment.157 Yet, when staring down rigid provisions in these positivist
contexts, would-be reformers have not resigned themselves to substantive
torpidity.158 Quite the opposite, in fact. Amid frozen legal landscapes, the
153 Alongside its primary aims, living evidentiary theory also seeks to renew a once-compelling
but now largely dormant academic debate at the intersection of evidence law and interpretive theory.
During the zenith of those discussions in the decades immediately following codiﬁcation, the leading
academic proponent of a textualist reading of the Federal Rules of Evidence was Professor Ed
Imwinkelried, who published many compelling and persuasive articles on the topic. See, e.g.,
Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 427 (“[Stating] three premier commandments for properly
interpreting legislature: ‘(1) Read the statute; (2) read the statute; [and] (3) read the statute!’”);
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Whether the Federal Rules of Evidence Should Be Conceived as a Perpetual Index
Code: Blindness Is Worse than Myopia, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1595, 1596 (1999) (discussing diﬀerent
textualist approaches judges have taken in construing the Federal Rules of Evidence). Conversely,
Professor Eileen Scallen advanced an argument that accords well with the driving motivation of
living evidentiary theory. Her compelling thesis argues that consideration of “practical reasoning”
should complement evaluation of the Federal Rules of Evidence’s text, particularly because
pragmatism is a “school ﬁrmly rooted in the realm of classical rhetoric and the method best suited
to the philosophical perspective of pragmatism that led to the creation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.” Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44 AM.
U. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1995) [hereinafter Scallen, Classical Rhetoric].
154 Cf. Jonathan S. Gould, Codifying Constitutional Norms, 109 GEO. L.J. 703, 756 (2021) (“The
biggest risk of rule-like codiﬁcation is ossiﬁcation.”).
155 Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 499 (2001) (describing the possibility of a formal constitutional
amendment as “impractical”).
156 See Heidi S. Alexander, The Theoretic and Democratic Implications of Anti-Abortion Trigger
Laws, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 381, 389 (2009) (“[M]inimal eﬀort is spent on repeal because it is more
diﬃcult to repeal a statute than to enact one.”); Matthew C. Stephenson, Does Separation of Powers
Promote Stability and Moderation?, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 331, 335 (2013) (“[S]eparation of powers . . .
makes it more diﬃcult to repeal or modify an enacted statute.”).
157 See Eloise Pasachoff, Administrative Rights in Institutional Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 117,
123 (2017) (“Formal regulations that become entrenched are much harder to change than mere guidance.”).
158 See Eskridge, supra note 155155, at 499 (“Now that formal constitutional amendment has
become impractical, constitutional change has come in other ways.”).
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pursuit of change has instead shifted attention to judicial opinions for
actualizing substantive evolution. That is, debates over appropriate judicial
decisionmaking philosophy take on added importance when judges constitute
the only practical vehicle for channeling law to a superior form.159 In the face
of positivist immobility, for example, should a judge stand back and defer to
the status quo? Or is a judge called to a more expansive role, one that sees her
channeling law to a better state?
Given its relative stagnation over the last half century, evidence law has
now arrived at that critical juncture. The pages above suggest that rulemakers
are unlikely to break the existing mold and progressively seek structural
change that will accord the Federal Rules of Evidence with modern empirical
and cultural understandings. Given the unlikelihood of reform through
formal channels, attention should turn to evidentiary jurisprudence. Was the
historic judicial hegemony over evidence law destroyed for good with the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence? Or, despite that shift, is there
still a meaningful opportunity for judges to reassume their historic role at the
forefront of evidentiary change?
Our search for answers begins, as it must, with a concession. The Federal
Rules of Evidence are here to stay. Despite the substantive critiques advanced
in this Article, there’s no doubt that the code has become entrenched as a core
component of the American juridical system. A copy of the Rules can be
found in every federal courthouse; every litigator has deep familiarity with
its contents. The optimal path forward, then, does not involve a call for
wholesale judicial usurpation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Nor should
it. An unmitigated judicial rejection of the Rules would constitute an
anarchical rejection of the very notion of positivism.160 And, as with any
reform proposal, the remedy cannot be worse than the ill.
Equally, though, accepting the centrality of the Federal Rules of
Evidence does not invariably demand that judges act as mere rubber
stamps, blindly applying the text of rules with no consideration of how
their rote evidentiary rulings accord with rulemakers’ intentions, the rule’s
purported basis, or modern empirical and normative understandings.
Rather, judges should be called to do just that—judge. With the Federal
Rules of Evidence as her guiding light, a judge should make evidentiary
159 See Lino A. Graglia, “Constitutional Theory”: The Attempted Justification for the Supreme Court’s
Liberal Political Program, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 789, 790-91 (1987) (“[T]he Court has become our primary
policy-making institution with respect to issues that determine the nature of a civilization and
quality of life in a society.”).
160 But see Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV.
630, 670-71 (1958) (“[T]he basic reason why positivism fears a purposive interpretation is not that it
may lead to anarchy, but that it may push us too far in the opposite direction. It sees in a purposive
interpretation, carried too far, a threat to human freedom and human dignity.”).
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rulings with a holistic perspective, coupling adherence to the rules with a
deep appreciation for modern realities.
But, in a principled sense, how exactly would that work?
1. Fidelity, Justiﬁability, and the Federal Rules of Evidence
We embark in the abstract. Where a doctrinal space concurrently faces a
pressing need for both positivist compliance and substantive evolution,
reformers can strike an ideal balance—they can eﬀect material change—by
adopting a quasi-Dworkinian interpretive model that comparatively weighs
two variables: “ﬁdelity” and “justiﬁability.”161 That is, judges can achieve
desirable reform by pinpointing an application of the law that expresses
fidelity to (i.e., accords with) the boundaries of existing legal source material
while also oﬀering the most justifiable (i.e., normatively desirable) outcome
within that permissible range.162 Legal outcomes thus remain constrained due
to the requirement that judges remain suﬃciently faithful to controlling law,
but within that often-broad boundary, judges have signiﬁcant latitude to best
shape the law in light of external realities.163
Living evidentiary theory contours “fidelity” and “justifiability” to evidence
law. It operationalizes the theoretical (and sometimes nebulous) concepts in
a manner that promises tangible, material rejuvenation of evidence law’s
substantive evolution. As the pages below illustrate, the living evidentiary
model encourages a judge to complement her reliance on the Federal Rules
of Evidence with an equally forceful appreciation for modern scientific and
cultural realities. Stated more technically, in applying an evidentiary rule,
living evidentiary theory pushes judges to move beyond a singular
evaluation of “fidelity”—a limited interpretive approach that has stymied
evidence law for the past half century—and instead couple that “fidelity”
analysis with deep consideration of which potential application of the
Federal Rules of Evidence is most normatively justifiable. Analogous
bespoke fashioning of “fidelity” and “justifiability” has successfully motivated
immense reform in other doctrinal spaces, most notably through the
eponymous framework of living constitutionalism and Judge Guido Calabresi’s
161 For a description of this Article’s relation to Dworkin’s theory of “law as integrity,” see
DWORKIN, supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, 53
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1978) (using the Dworkinian interpretive model when rebutting arguments that
questions of law do not have right answers).
162 See DWORKIN, supra note 34, at 230-32 (explaining the two dimensions of ﬁt and
justiﬁcation using novelists as an analogy).
163 See DWORKIN, supra note 34, at 119-20 (“[L]aw as integrity . . . does not limit law to what
convention ﬁnds in past decisions but directs [the judge] also to regard as law what morality would
suggest to be the best justiﬁcation of these past decisions.”); cf. Balkin, supra note 3737, at 1133 (“[Living
constitutionalism] is flexible but not lawless, adaptable to circumstance yet constrained by long tradition.”).
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model for reinvigorating torpid statutory spaces.164 So, too, can “fidelity” and
“justifiability” revive evidence law.
Granular examination of living evidentiary theory’s unique employment
of “ﬁdelity” and “justiﬁability” is therefore in order. As noted above, living
evidentiary theory’s “ﬁdelity” variable asks judges to consider how well a
potential application of an evidentiary rule comports with the text and intent
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Though facially intuitive, the “ﬁdelity”
analysis is deeply substantive in application—indeed, there’s likely to be wide
disagreement regarding the outer boundary and reach of the “ﬁdelity”
domain. Just how faithful to a Federal Rule of Evidence must a judge be when
applying it? Consider a grounding example. Broadly stated, Federal Rule of
Evidence 408 renders inadmissible statements made during settlement
negotiations.165 Thus, a judge’s interpretation of Rule 408 would of course
express “ﬁdelity” to the code if she read Rule 408 to exclude exactly that—
statements made during settlement negotiations.166 After all, such an
interpretation directly maps onto Rule 408’s text.167 Conversely, the judge
would plainly violate the interpretive “ﬁdelity” requirement if she simply
ignored Rule 408 and independently declared statements made during
settlement negotiations fair game for litigants at trial. Regardless of which
canon of construction the judge employs, there’s no plausible way to reconcile
that outcome with the text or intent of Rule 408.168 But what about the murky
middle ground that lies between those two extreme occurrences? For instance,
what if a judge believes that, in the context of a particular case, the best
outcome is to allow a party to introduce her opponent’s settlement statements
because those statements fraudulently induced the party to continue to
engage in action that maximized the opponent’s claim against her?169 From a
strict textualist standpoint, a limited admissibility carveout enabling the
party to admit the opponent’s fraudulent settlement statements doesn’t seem
to ﬁt within the boundaries of Rule 408; there is no textual exception for

164 See STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 35, at 1-3 (explaining the U.S.
constitutional system leverages common law precedent to “allow room for adaptation and change,
but only . . . in ways that are rooted in the past”); CALABRESI, supra note 38, at 164 (“[The common
law function] is no more and no less than the critical task of deciding when a retentionist or a
revisionist bias is appropriately applied to an existing statutory or common law rule.”).
165 FED. R. EVID. 408.
166 Id.; see, e.g., Am. Heartland Port, Inc. v. Am. Port Holdings, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 871, 881
(N.D. W. Va. 2014) (“Federal Rule of Evidence 408 clearly provides that settlement negotiations as
evidence generally are inadmissible.”).
167 FED. R. EVID. 408.
168 See id.
169 This hypothetical is a loose adaptation of the events at issue in Bankcard Am., Inc. v.
Universal Bancard Sys., Inc., 203 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2000).
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curative admissibility.170 But from a purposivist or pragmatic vantage point,
interpreting Rule 408 to only protect good-faith settlement negotiations
comfortably comports with rulemakers intentions. After all, in creating Rule
408, rulemakers intended to make settlement negotiations more efficient;
they didn’t intend to offer an avenue for fraud.171 What this simple exercise
demonstrates, then, is that the scope of the “fidelity” variable is often a point
of contention. It pits canons of construction against one another to
determine just how much conformity the Federal Rules of Evidence demand.
And, notably for our purposes, a pragmatic or purposivist interpreter often
finds herself with substantial leeway to reconcile desirable outcomes with
the spirit of a commanding rule.172
But “ﬁdelity” alone is only half the battle. An over-emphasis on ﬁdelity
in interpretation will stagnate substantive law if the controlling source
material is itself immobile.173 Indeed, a ﬁdelity over-prioritization is the very
ill that has stymied evidence law for the past half century.174 No, progressive
reform requires a coupling of “ﬁdelity” with a serious, and perhaps primary,
emphasis on “justiﬁability.”175 That is, for substantive evolution to occur in a
frozen positivist space like evidence law, judges must move beyond the
“ﬁdelity” assessment and place determinative weight on which potential
interpretation and application of an evidentiary rule best “justiﬁes” the
continued preeminence of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Here, we see the
evolutionary potential of the framework. Assessing justiﬁability, assessing
which potential outcome is most normatively desirable, necessarily invokes
externally facing analysis.176 When comparing diﬀerent reasonable
170 See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 177 n.2 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(noting that curative admissibility is an “exercise of judicial discretion”).
171 FED. R. EVID. 408. advisory committee’s notes (“The policy considerations which underlie
the rule do not come into play when the eﬀort is to induce a creditor to settle an admittedly due
amount for a lessor sum.”).
172 See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1759 (2010) (“Purposivists typically
embrace a more ﬂexible approach, an approach from which modiﬁed textualism’s strict interpretive
hierarchy is a departure.”).
173 See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of
Evidence, 68 TEXAS L. REV. 745, 784 (1990) (“The plain-meaning standard will do more than just
transform the evidentiary landscape; it will also freeze the new forms into unchanging shapes.”).
174 Id. (“The plain-meaning rubric . . . squelches evidence law’s historic dynamism and
abolishes common-law methods of resolving evidentiary disputes.”).
175 See Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, supra note 153, at 1759 (arguing that applying the Federal Rules
of Evidence is not a process in “discovering the true or correct interpretation, but that it is
constructing the best interpretation possible in a particular context”).
176 Cf. Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of Interpretive Universalism: Toward the Reconstruction of
Legal Theory, 72 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 10 (1993) (“At the heart of Dworkin’s picture of justiﬁcation lies
the idea that to be justiﬁed, law must be validated by something beyond the conﬁnes of text,
precedent, legislative purpose, and history.”).
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applications of an evidentiary rule, all of which express suﬃcient ﬁdelity to
the text or intent of the Federal Rules of Evidence, judges can and should
incorporate insight from scientiﬁc, empirical, and normative literatures to
determine the optimal path forward. And, as with the ﬁdelity analysis, this
normative weighing is deeply sophisticated. It aﬀords judges latitude to
incorporate previously inaccessible analytical frameworks into evidence law.
Critical legal studies, law and economics, and legal process theory (among
other schools) all become useful and viable reference points for discerning
which potential application of the code is most justiﬁable. The social
psychology, neuroscience, and criminal justice literatures all become
indispensable components of a judge’s toolkit when operationalizing the
Federal Rules. Indeed, the power of “justiﬁability” lies in its ability to harness
external realties to determine the best application of the Rules.
Of course, by now it will be clear that “ﬁdelity” and “justiﬁability” are
often negatively correlated. All else being equal, judges will (and should)
naturally gravitate toward an interpretation of controlling law that constitutes
the best fit with the legal source material.177 For instance, if the most
“justifiable” outcome identified by a judge is obtainable simply by hewing
closely to the text of an evidentiary rule, there’s no reason for the judge to
depart from that comfortable interpretation—and to decrease the “fidelity” of
her interpretation—just to achieve the same normative good. Simply put, then,
where “fidelity” and “justifiability” work together, both should be maximized.
The more diﬃcult situation is likely the more common one. When
“ﬁdelity” and “justiﬁability” work not in tandem but rather in opposition,
what is to be done? Let’s return, for instance, to the Rule 408 example
introduced above. Recall that, in the diﬃcult variant of that hypothetical, a
party seeks to introduce her opponent’s statements from settlement
negotiations because those statements fraudulently induced her to more
severely damage her opponent’s property (thereby maximizing the value of
his claim).178 Once again, if a judge seeks to maximize “ﬁdelity,” the likely
application of Rule 408 is to exclude the opponent’s fraudulent statement
because it is a “statement made during compromise negotiations about the
claim” that is oﬀered to “prove or disprove the validity or amount of a
disputed claim.”179 Conversely, if a judge seeks to maximize “justifiability,” the

177 See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079,
1115-16 (2017) (“[T]he approaches used in our legal system should be conducted as legal argument,
based on legal materials.”).
178 See Bankcard Am., Inc. v. Universal Bancard Sys., Inc., 203 F.3d 477, 484 (7th Cir. 2000).
179 FED. R. EVID. 408.
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opposite result is probably the right one.180 The normative literature, for example,
demonstrates the superiority of curative admissibility. From, say, an efficiency
standpoint, the most normatively desirable way to apply Rule 408 is to refrain
from protecting fraudulent statements as those statements will induce misguided
(not profit-maximizing) actions.181 From a critical perspective, alternatively, Rule
408 should not be read to protect fraudulent statements as the likely victims of
fraudulent inducement will be, and historically have been, members of
marginalized groups.182 Under any number of external lenses, the permissive
interpretation seems more justifiable.
Stepping back, then, one can see how this hypothetical gives rise to a
tension between “ﬁdelity” and “justiﬁability.” To maximize ﬁdelity, a judge
must forgo the optimal normative outcome. To maximize justiﬁability, a judge
must adopt a more purposivist or pragmatic interpretive approach that ﬁts
Rule 408 less closely than a textualist methodology. One variable must take
precedence, but which one?
In the face of a frozen positivist landscape, emphasizing “justiﬁability”
over “ﬁdelity” is the superior approach. From a structural perspective,
prioritizing ﬁdelity places the locus of substantive evolution directly with
rulemakers; a ﬁdelity emphasis necessarily sees judges refraining from an
eﬀort to channel law to a better form.183 In an active, fully functioning
doctrinal space, perhaps such deference is warranted. If the applicable
rulemakers are proactive about fostering substantive evolution and aligning
evidence law with our best normative and empirical understandings of the
world around us, then it makes sense for judges to defer to those rulemakers
in their appointed roles.184 But where the system breaks down, and
substantive evolution is untenable solely because of bureaucratic and
administrative roadblocks, judges are right to take a more active hand in
developing doctrine. That is, under such circumstances, judges are right to
relatively (but not wholly) deemphasize ﬁdelity and instead channel law to a

180 See Bankcard Am., 203 F.3d at 484 (“It would be an abuse of Rule 408 to allow one party
during compromise negotiations to lead his opponent to believe that he will not enforce applicable time
limitations and then object when the opponent attempts to prove the waiver of time limitations.”).
181 See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 768 (1983)
(“[I]f a large number of fraudulent bargains are enforced, the eﬃciencies of a strict proof system
may be outweighed by its ineﬃciencies.”).
182 Audrey G. McFarlane, The Properties of Instability: Markets, Predation, Racialized Geography,
and Property Law, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 855, 885 (“[F]orce and fraud will be concentrated towards one
end of the spectrum, or to say it another way, concentrated racially, by class and geography.”).
183 See Jonakait, supra note 173, at 784 (“The plain-meaning standard will do more than just
transform the evidentiary landscape; it will also freeze the new forms into unchanging shapes.”).
184 Cf. Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 412 (arguing that the text of the Federal Rules of Evidence
should be given “far more weight” than extrinsic materials).
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superior form by emphasizing the justiﬁcatory aspect of legal interpretation.
Where positive law is frozen, revival comes through a more active judiciary.
Having explored the technical mechanics of living evidentiary theory, a
few representative examples now help demonstrate the model’s potential.
Return, ﬁrst, to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2), generally known as the
excited utterance exception. The rule allows hearsay statements into the
courtroom if, inter alia, the statement was made when the declarant was under
the shock of a startling event.185 By now, it is widely known that the excited
utterance exception rests on folk psychology.186 Rulemakers initially claimed
that statements made under stressful or panicked conditions are inherently
trustworthy because the declarant is not in a position to fabricate.187 Of
course, modern empirical literature has largely disproven the general claim
that stress aids declarant reliability; in truth, it has the opposite eﬀect.188
Nonetheless, given the dormancy of evidence law, the excited utterance
exception stands strong. Despite its empirical fallibilities, it continues to
serve as a vehicle for ushering unreliable hearsay statements into the
courtroom. And, within our existing framework, that comes as no surprise.
For example, for a judge adopting a textualist posture toward the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the technically correct move is to continue to allow excited
utterances into the courtroom. That interpretation maximizes “ﬁdelity.”
But living evidentiary theory changes the game. Since text and purpose—
the notion of “ﬁdelity”—no longer exhaust the requisite interpretive analysis,
a judge must also turn her attention to the modern scientiﬁc literature to
consider whether applying the excited utterance exception in a fashion that
simply ignores empirical truth constitutes the most justiﬁable option among
the range of acceptable approaches. Of course, it doesn’t. Instead, recognizing
that Rule 803(2)’s empirical basis has largely been vitiated, a judge should
reassume her historic power to craft a solution—to step in where rulemakers
will not. And here, a weighing of both ﬁdelity and justiﬁability reveals a

FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
See, e.g., Liesa L. Richter, Goldilocks and the Rule 803 Hearsay Exceptions, 59 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 897, 918-19 (2018) (“Judge Posner has suggested that the present sense impression and
excited utterance exceptions represent nothing more than baseless ‘folk psychology’ and laments a
judge’s obligation to admit them.”).
187 See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (1975)
(“[C]ircumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of
reﬂection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication.”); United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d
116, 127 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The rationale for this hearsay exception [excited utterances] is that the
excitement of the event limits the declarant’s capacity to fabricate a statement and thereby oﬀers
some guarantee of its reliability.”).
188 See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 28, § 272, at 366 (“The entire basis for the
[excited utterance] exception may . . . be questioned. . . . [given] the distorting eﬀect of shock and
excitement upon the declarant’s observation and judgement.”).
185
186
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number of superior approaches to the administration of the excited utterance
exception in the courtroom. For instance, a judge might note that blindly
applying Rule 803(2) to every statement made under stressful or startling
conditions risks vitiating its basis entirely—in many instances, these
statements will be less reliable, not more.189 Thus, perhaps a superior means
of applying the excited utterance exception is to require that proponents oﬀer
proof not only satisfying the rule’s enshrined elements but also aﬃrmatively
demonstrating reliability. That is, a judge could evolve the application of the
excited utterance exception to require a demonstration of trustworthiness
that directly addresses the contrary scientiﬁc consensus. Notably, this
approach still expresses ﬁdelity to Rule 803(2)—albeit in a purposivist
sense.190 But, when trying to determine the optimal approach to interpreting
and applying Rule 803(2), the purposivist model above is more justiﬁable
than a strict textualism given its ability to align evidence law with best
empirical understandings. Rather than turning a blind eye to folk psychology
in our evidentiary regime, the judge channels evidence law to a better form.
As suggested above, living evidentiary theory does not solely premise
reform on improved empirical and scientiﬁc understandings; rather, it also
seeks to align evidence law with modern cultural sentiments and evolving
standards of decency. Consider, as one of many potential examples, how the
living evidentiary model might bring reform to Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b). Generally stated, Rule 606(b) prevents a juror from testifying about
the jury’s decisionmaking process.191 From a technical standpoint, where there
is an “inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment,” Rule 606(b)(1)
prevents a juror from testifying about “any statement made or incident that
occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or
another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or
indictment.”192 Like many provisions in the evidentiary code, exceptions to this
broad exclusionary rule exist. For instance, jurors are permitted to testify that
“extraneous prejudicial information” infected deliberations or that “an outside
influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror.”193 For most of its
existence, though, Rule 606(b) has offered little solace to defendants convicted
by a malevolent or prejudiced jury. Courts, centrally focused on text and
Id.
See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory Precedents, 104 VA. L. REV. 157, 160
(2018) (“[T]extualists tend to prioritize the predictability and stability of legal rules and other ‘rule
of law’ values over the ﬂexibility associated with looser, case-by-case decision-making. Purposivists,
by contrast, tend to be more willing to tolerate inconsistency and case-by-case adjudication.”).
191 See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (prohibiting jurors from testifying as a witness before other jurors
or about their deliberations unless an exception applies).
192 FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1).
193 FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2).
189
190
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“fidelity,” have interpreted Rule 606(b)’s exceptions in an exceedingly narrow
fashion.194 For instance, a recalcitrant juror cannot testify that the jury
completely ignored the judge’s instructions, or that it otherwise convicted a
defendant on some legally irrelevant basis.195 She can’t testify that the jury spent
the entirety of a trial intoxicated.196 As far as Rule 606(b) is concerned, she can’t
even testify that invidious prejudice or animus served as the basis of a jury’s
verdict.197 In application, then, Rule 606(b) has proven immensely problematic.
Applying living evidentiary theory to Rule 606(b)’s exceptions, the model
does not fetishize ﬁt; nor does it protect prejudicial decisionmaking by
narrowly insisting that that outcome accords best with Rule 606(b)’s text.
Instead, in light of rulemaker stagnation, an interpreter should couple
“ﬁdelity” with “justiﬁability” to pinpoint which application of Rule 606(b) is
suﬃciently faithful to the rule and most normatively defensible. When
viewed through that holistic lens, it is clear that Rule 606(b) should not be
applied in a manner that protects, indeed enables, prejudice and misconduct
in the deliberation room.198 Rather, courts should allow jurors to testify about
decisionmaking animus, perhaps by adopting a more permissive reading of
Rule 606(b)’s exceptions. After all, in enshrining the no-impeachment rule,
rulemakers sought to foster more legitimate trial verdicts.199 But if legitimacy
is the coin of the realm, then animus and prejudice in the deliberation room
should be exposed and condemned, not protected. Indeed, it is hard to think
of a verdict basis more illegitimate than a conviction premised on problematic

194 See Capra & Richter, supra note 121, at 1883 (“Although the prohibition on juror testimony
is subject to exceptions when the jurors are exposed to extraneous prejudicial information or outside
inﬂuences, courts have interpreted these exceptions narrowly and constitutional challenges to the
Rule 606(b) prohibition have traditionally proved unsuccessful.”).
195 See, e.g., United States v. Ewing, 749 F. App’x 317, 322 (6th Cir. 2018) (“A juror’s statement
suggesting that the jury misunderstood or misapplied instructions or the law is also typically
considered internal and therefore subject to Rule 606(b)’s bar.”).
196 See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 122 (1987) (holding that “outside inﬂuence” does
not include juror intoxication by drugs or alcohol).
197 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
198 See Steven D. DeBrota, Arguments Appealing to Racial Prejudice: Uncertainty, Impartiality, and
the Harmless Error Doctrine, 64 IND. L.J. 375, 388 (1989) (“Arguments appealing to the racial
prejudices of the jury are anathema to a multiracial society founded on principles of racial equality
and equal treatment under law.”).
199 See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (discussing how
prohibiting jurors from impeaching their own verdicts is designed to “promot[e] . . . [the] freedom
of deliberation, stability and ﬁnality of verdicts, and protection of jurors against annoyance and
embarrassment”); Ashok Chandran, Color in the “Black Box”: Addressing Racism in Juror Deliberations,
5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 28, 36 (2015) (“[B]y the time of Tanner, it was accepted that the core purpose
of Rule 606(b) was to preserve the legitimacy of the jury process.”).
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animus against the defendant.200 Far from usurping Rule 606(b), then, living
evidentiary theory again gives the rule its best form.
One ﬁnal aspect of living evidentiary theory warrants exploration: despite
the model’s radical reform proposals, one might fairly question whether living
evidentiary theory can actually aﬀect doctrine in a tangible way. Can
“ﬁdelity” and “justiﬁability” truly bring material, principled change to
evidence law? Or is it, at best, mere academic whimsy?
Fortunately, here, we need not speculate. As mentioned above, “ﬁdelity”
and “justiﬁability” have already been operationalized in a bespoke fashion to
eﬀect signiﬁcant substantive evolution amid other frozen doctrinal spaces.
Consider, for example, living evidentiary theory’s eponymous cousin—the
burgeoning jurisprudential approach known as “living constitutionalism.”201
Just like this Article’s proposal regarding the Federal Rules of Evidence, living
constitutionalism did not emerge from an ex ante claim the United States
Constitution is inherently ﬂawed. Instead, living constitutionalism emerged
in the face of a frozen positivist system.202 The “cumbersome amendment
process” housed in Article V has made it functionally impossible to amend
the Constitution.203 To borrow Professor David Strauss’s words, “the world
has changed in incalculable ways . . . [a]nd it is just not realistic to expect the
cumbersome amendment process to keep up with these changes.”204 Because
the formal avenue of constitutional change has largely become foreclosed,
living constitutionalism instead encourages functional constitutional
amendment via judicial intervention. That is, it sees judicial evolution of
constitutional law “necessary if the Constitution is to meet the needs of a
changing society.”205 And, molding similar “ﬁdelity” and “justiﬁability”
principles to the ones espoused above, living constitutionalism not only
encourages judges to weigh faithfulness to source text when choosing among
possible interpretations of the Constitution, but it also spurs judges to
complement that ﬁt assessment with equal consideration of which possible
outcome achieves a normatively optimal result.206 It sees constitutional text
as a constraining and informative (but not necessarily exhaustive) data point
200 See United States v. Krohn, 573 F.2d 1382, 1389 (10th Cir. 1978) (“[A]ny appeal to racial
prejudice is a foul blow which must be rejected by the courts.”).
201 See Scott Dodson, A Darwinist View of the Living Constitution, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1319, 1320 (2008)
(describing a “‘living’ Constitution” as “one that adapts to changing circumstances and evolves over time”).
202 See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text.
203 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 24 (5th ed. 2015).
204 STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 35, at 1-2.
205 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 203, at 24.
206 See Balkin, supra note 37, at 1133 (noting how common law decisionmaking encouraged by
living constitutionalism is “ﬂexible but not lawless, adaptable to circumstance yet constrained by
long tradition” and that “[i]t protects fundamental rights from transient public opinion and adapts
to changing times without becoming a plaything of the judges”).
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in determining how the principles and ideals housed in the Constitution
apply to evolving modern circumstances.207 And, in uniquely adopting
elements of the bivariant model, living constitutionalism did not surrender
to substantive torpidity. It did not merely resign itself to the fact that formal
constitutional amendments are unlikely to survive Article V’s arduous
hurdles. Instead, living constitutionalism harnessed “ﬁdelity” and
“justiﬁability” to eﬀect immense constitutional change.
Living constitutionalism is a ray of hope for evidence law. It demonstrates
that “ﬁdelity” and “justiﬁability” can indeed inspire tangible substantive
evolution despite the impassibility of formal amendment channels. Moreover,
the factors and circumstances that led to the initial emergence of living
constitutionalism now, too, echo in evidence law. Evidence law’s turn to
codiﬁcation has left it with an evidentiary regime that is, by and large,
immobile. Living constitutionalism’s solution therefore informs the path
ahead for our evidentiary regime. Judges should serve as vehicles of change
when interpreting and applying the Federal Rules of Evidence.
2. Rulemakers as Regulators
By now, one might fairly question whether living evidentiary theory is
simply a façade masking a deeper discomfort with positivism generally. Isn’t
the model just an attempt to roll back evidence law’s codiﬁcation eﬀort?
Doesn’t it simply express a preference for common law decisionmaking? If so,
some might (rightly) insist that the project calls for little more than judicially
sanctioned anarchy.208 Without reconciling living evidentiary theory’s core
tenets with a political reality that vests ultimate decision-making authority
over evidence law with rulemakers, the model risks becoming perceived as
little more than a call for a judicial power grab.
Despite its intuitive appeal, this critique is ultimately misplaced.
The division of authority in the development of evidence law is not a
zero-sum game. The locus of substantive evolution is not indivisible, and
forcing a complete tradeoﬀ between rulemakers and the judiciary is a false
dilemma. Pushing back against that faux binary, the living evidentiary model
introduced above seeks to foster a symbiotic, mutually beneﬁcial relationship
207 See id. (describing how constitutional text “serves primarily as a focal point” and noting the
“virtues” of “[c]ommon-law decision making”).
208 Cf. Balkin, supra note 37, at 1131 (“[T]he central problem that living constitutionalism faces
is constraining judicial behavior.”); Barry J. Swanson, Cloning and the Constitution: An Inquiry into
Governmental Policymaking and Genetic Experimentation, 84 MICH. L. REV. 658, 661 (1986)
(reviewing IRA H. CARMEN, CLONING AND THE CONSTITUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO
GOVERNMENTAL POLICYMAKING AND GENETIC EXPERIMENTATION (1985)) (noting that some
forms of living constitutionalism “inevitably result in constitutional anarchy with each person
defining his or her own constitutional rights”).
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among rulemakers and the judiciary. In fact, the practical eﬀect of
incorporating “ﬁdelity” and “justiﬁability” into the judicial interpretation of
the Federal Rules of Evidence is an ideal division of labor. Judges seek to
make the code the best it can be, but their innovation potential is constrained
by the need to suﬃciently ﬁt or comport their application of an evidentiary
rule with the existing code.209 The judiciary’s role is to optimize application
of the Federal Rules without wholly departing from its contents.210
Concurrently, living evidentiary theory sees rulemakers’ role as more vital
than ever before. As judicial innovation occurs, it remains the rulemakers’
responsibility to oﬀer the ﬁnal word regarding evidence law’s development
by expressly endorsing, abrogating, or systematizing certain judicial
innovations. Far from usurping rulemakers’ authority, living evidentiary
theory puts rulemakers in the best position to eﬀect positive change. For the
past half century, rulemakers have largely been unable to bring material
improvement to evidence law given the arduous bureaucratic maze required
for even the smallest adjustment to the Federal Rules of Evidence.211 Through
the living evidentiary framework, though, rulemakers can eﬃciently shape
evidence law by fostering and grooming judicially inspired evolution.
Though perceiving of rulemakers as regulators (rather than innovators) of
evidence law might initially seem a radical departure from the status quo, the
truth is that our evidentiary system has already seen a forerunning drift
toward this model. Despite the formalities of the current system—formalities
that technically require any amendment or alteration to the Federal Rules of
Evidence to come from rulemakers212—experience suggests that courts are
increasingly exhibiting an eagerness to reassume their historic position at the
progressive spearpoint of evidentiary change, and rulemakers appear equally
willing to embrace a more evaluative, regulatory function. Simply put, the
doctrinal space has organically positioned itself for the arrival of living
evidentiary theory.

209 For an analog demonstrating how text can constrain purposivist interpretation, see Kevin
M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV.
871, 879-80 (2015) (“[A]ttention to the foundation of purposivism in positive law extends recent
work recognizing the ‘new,’ ‘structured,’ or ‘textually constrained’ positivist purposivism in judicial
practice, which relies more heavily on statutory text as a basis for understanding purpose and views
purposivist interpretations as constrained by statutory text.”).
210 See Balkin, supra note 37, at 1133 (noting how living constitutionalism is “ﬂexible but not
lawless, adaptable to circumstance . . . without becoming a plaything of the judges”).
211 See Jonakait, supra note 173, at 784 (“As the plain-meaning standard replaces the common
law methods, much of evidence law’s capacity for orderly growth is lost.”).
212 Teter, supra note 4, at 154 (describing how amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence
are entertained by the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court, and Congress).
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Consider, for instance, the genesis of many existing amendments to the
Federal Rules of Evidence. We’d expect that, if evidence law were truly
committed to a purely positivist regime, most (if not all) of the changes to
the Federal Rules of Evidence would follow formal channels—that is, the
amendments would originate in the Advisory Committee before commencing
on their long journey through the Standing Committee, Supreme Court, and
Congress.213 Of course, technically speaking, each amendment to the Rules
has survived that labyrinth. But a survey of the changes made to the Federal
Rules of Evidence reveals that many amendments have not found their true
inception in rulemaking committees. Rulemakers have not acted as the
system’s sole innovators. Rather, caselaw has increasingly motivated
evidentiary change. Of the formal amendments made to our evidentiary
regime since 1975, for example, no less than fourteen have their genesis in
judicial decisions. The amendments to Rules 609, 701, 702, 801, and 803 all
came in direct response to a prior court decision wrestling with their
application.214 For example, rulemakers’ 1997 Amendment to Rule
801(d)(2)(E) was motivated by issues ﬁrst raised in the Supreme Court’s
United States v. Bourjaily opinion.215 And in resolving one of those issues,
rulemakers merely enshrined the preexisting solution already advanced by
circuit courts of appeals.216 The Supreme Court’s prominent decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. inspired rulemakers to revisit
Rule 702.217 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts spurred changes to Rule 803.218

See id.; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 60, § 5006.
FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s note to 1990 amendment (“The amendment to
Rule 609(a) makes two changes in the rule. The ﬁrst change removes from the rule the limitation
that the conviction may only be elicited during cross-examination, a limitation that virtually every
circuit has found to be inapplicable.”); FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note to 2000
amendment (“The amendment incorporates the distinctions set forth in State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d
530, 549 ([Tenn.] 1992), a case involving former Tennessee Rule of Evidence 701, a rule that
precluded lay witness testimony based on ‘special knowledge.’”); FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory
committee’s note to 2000 amendment (“Rule 702 has been amended in response to Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and to the many cases applying Daubert, including
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.[ ] Ct. 1167 (1999).”); FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s
note to 1997 amendment (“Rule 801(d)(2) has been amended in order to respond to three issues
raised by Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).”); FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s
note to 2013 amendment) (“Rule 803(10) has been amended in response to Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557. U.S. 305 (2009).”).
215 Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 173 (1987).
216 See, e.g., United States v. Beckham, 968 F.2d 47, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (collecting sources); see
also FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment (same).
217 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
218 FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note to 2013 amendment (“Rule 803(10) has been
amended in response to Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.”) (citation omitted).
213
214
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Indeed, courts inspired the creation of Rule 804(b)(6) altogether.219 Still
other amendments to Rules 103, 404, 407, 408, 606, 703, 804, and 807 were
motivated by circuit splits or “questions in the court” that forced the
rulemakers to step in and provide clariﬁcation.220 And again, rulemakers’ 1997
amendment to Rule 407 simply enshrined circuit courts’ already-existent view
that Rule 407 does indeed apply to product liability actions.221 Stepping back,
then, the historical record demonstrates that courts can motivate (and have
motivated) doctrinal evolution; likewise, rulemakers’ assumption of a regulatory
role would be far from unprecedented. Living evidentiary theory thus
affirmatively embraces a model that the system is increasingly geared to accept.
Judges’ and rulemakers’ seemingly anomalous treatment of Rule 410 also
points to the future viability of living evidentiary theory. Rule 410 is a
specialized relevance rule dealing with, inter alia, statements made during
criminal plea negotiations.222 The text of the rule forbids a party from
introducing statements made during plea negotiations “against the defendant
who . . . participated.”223 As one might intuit, Rule 410 largely constitutes an
219 FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment (noting that, prior to the
enactment of Rule 804(b)(6), every circuit had already “recognized the principle of forfeiture by
misconduct, although the tests for determining whether there is a forfeiture have varied”).
220 FED. R. EVID. 103 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (“The amendment
applies to all rulings on evidence whether they occur at or before trial, including so-called “in limine”
rulings. . . . Courts have taken diﬀering approaches to this question.”); FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory
committee’s note to 2006 amendment (“The amendment resolves the dispute in the case law over
whether the exceptions in subdivisions (a)(1) and (2) permit the circumstantial use of character
evidence in civil cases.”); FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment (“This
amendment adopts the view of a majority of the circuits that have interpreted Rule 407 to apply to
products liability actions.”); FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment
(“Rule 408 has been amended to settle some questions in the courts about the scope of the Rule
. . . .”); FED. R. EVID. 606 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment (“The amendment
responds to a divergence between the text of the Rule and the case law that has established an
exception for proof of clerical errors.”); FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note to 2000
amendment (“Courts have reached diﬀerent results on how to treat inadmissible information when
it is reasonably relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion or drawing an inference.”); FED. R.
EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment (“Every circuit that has resolved the
question has recognized the principle of forfeiture by misconduct, although the tests for determining
whether there is a forfeiture have varied.”); FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory committee’s note to 2019
amendment (“Rule 807 has been amended to ﬁx a number of problems that the courts have
encountered in applying it.”).
221 See, e.g., Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1522 (1st Cir. 1991); In re Joint E. Dist.
& S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 995 F.2d 343, 345 (2d Cir. 1993); Cann
v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981); Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1275
(3d Cir. 1992); Werner v. Upjohn, Inc., 628 F.2d 848, 856 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080
(1981); Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir. 1983); Bauman
v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir. 1980); Flaminio v. Honda Motor
Company, Ltd., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984); Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 636-37 (9th Cir.
1986); see also FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment (collecting sources).
222 See FED. R. EVID. 410.
223 Id.
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eﬃciency-oriented intervention by rulemakers.224 Cognizant of the fact that
our criminal justice system is now, functionally, a system of pleas, Rule 410
seeks to encourage the viability of plea discussions by placing a ﬁrewall
around the negotiation table.225 Nothing said by the defendant—even the
most probative and inculpatory admission—can later be used against him at
trial.226 Drafters therefore saw Rule 410 as encouraging frank, open, and
honest discussions about the possibility of a plea deal.227
But Rule 410 contains an oddity. Despite drafters’ intention to place a
ﬁrewall around plea negotiations, the text of the rule only forbids parties from
introducing statements against the defendant who participated; there is no
textual prohibition that equivalently prevents defendants from using
statements against, say, prosecutors.228 But allowing a defendant to introduce
statements against a prosecutor risks vitiating the rule’s entire purpose. As a
logical matter, if a prosecutor fears that her statements during plea
negotiations will later come back to haunt her, there’s a material risk that
she’ll avoid robust, transparent plea negotiations altogether. In recognition of
this phenomenon, courts innovated by functionally amending Federal Rule
of Evidence 410 to also exclude plea statements oﬀered against prosecutors.
In United States v. Verdoorn, for example, the Eighth Circuit made clear its
intention to broaden the scope of Rule 410 to better achieve rulemakers’
intention to ensure “that plea negotiations remain conﬁdential to the parties
if they are unsuccessful.”229 And since Verdoorn, judges across the country have
followed suit, generally “ignor[ing] the strict language of the rule” and
“barr[ing] the evidence.”230 Conceptually, though retroactively, living
evidentiary theory easily explains the judicially driven functional amendment
to Rule 410. Sensing Rule 410’s textual oddity, courts searched for a more
justiﬁable application of the Rule that still expressed ﬁdelity to its spirit. For
the Verdoorn court, that interpretive approach led to a broad reading of Rule

224 Julia A. Keck, United States v. Sylvester: The Expansion of the Waiver of Federal Rule of Evidence
410 to Allow Case-in-Chief Use of Plea Negotiation Statements, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1385, 1397-98 (2010).
225 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (quoting Chaﬃn v. Stynchcombe, 412
U.S. 17, 31 714 (1973)) (discussing the United States’ “system which tolerates and encourages the
negotiation of pleas”).
226 Eric Rasmusen, Mezzanatto and the Economics of Self-Incrimination, 19 CARDOZO L. REV.
1541, 1579 (1998).
227 FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee’s notes on 1975 proposed rules.
228 See FED. R. EVID. 410; Nick Bell, Comment, “Against the Defendant”: Plea Rule’s Purpose v.
Plain Meaning, 73 ARK. L. REV. 425, 426 (2020).
229 528 F.2d 103, 107 (8th Cir. 1976) (“Meaningful dialogue between the parties would, as a
practical matter, be impossible if either party had to assume the risk that plea oﬀers would be
admissible in evidence.”).
230 GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 143 (3d. ed 2013).
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410.231 Of course, following that judicial innovation, rulemakers retained
authority to rein in—to regulate—this judicial discretion with a clear
directive.232 For instance, an Advisory Committee Note could have foreclosed
Verdoorn’s expansion of Rule 410; even through the prism of living evidentiary
theory, it would have entirely vitiated the “ﬁdelity” of the Eighth Circuit’s
expanded Rule 410 interpretation because of the clear contrary directive. But
rulemakers stayed their hand. Instead, they endorsed Verdoorn’s judicial
innovation by omitting such an addition.
In these examples, we begin to see glimpses of the potential of living
evidentiary theory. By encouraging judges to improve the application of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence law again begins to evolve. It again
assumes its historic march toward a more empirically sound and normatively
desirable system of truth-seeking. At the same time, rulemakers remain as
important as ever. They must regulate substantive evolution to maintain
uniformity and stability in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Where judicial
innovation causes a circuit split, rulemakers endorse the optimal path
forward. Where judicial innovation results in a misstep, rulemakers claw back
the proposed change. Where judicial innovation is unequivocally beneﬁcial,
rulemakers systematize the identiﬁed improvement. Thus, from a pragmatic
vantagepoint, living evidentiary theory does not usurp rulemakers. It
empowers them.
3. Overcoming Textualism’s Hegemony
In her oft-quoted 2015 speech, Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan
gamely declared, “We’re all textualists now.”233 What Justice Kagan meant to
convey, of course, is that the ascendency of textualism has been ubiquitous in
the American legal system over the past ﬁfty years.234 Simply put, textualism
has become the elephant in the interpretive room.
It will thus come as no surprise to learn that textualism currently has a deep
hold over evidence law. After all, the Supreme Court has encouraged judges to
use the “traditional tools of statutory construction” when interpreting and
applying the Federal Rules of Evidence.235 Within that traditional toolbelt,
textualist reasoning is a centerpiece. Moreover, the Court itself has increasingly
231 Verdoorn, 528 F.2d at 107 (8th Cir. 1976) (“If [Rule 410’s] policy is to be fostered, it is
essential that plea negotiations remain conﬁdential to the parties if they are unsuccessful.”).
232 See id.
233 Elena Kagan, Assoc. Just., U.S. Sup. Ct., The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice
Kagan on the Reading of Statutes (Nov. 17, 2015).
234 See also Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 23-43
(2006) (tracing the growth of modern textualism).
235 Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163 (1988) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987)).
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drifted toward textualism when reading the Rules.236 Strict application of the
Federal Rules of Evidence is common; judicial consideration of the merits of
that approach has been, to this point, quite rare.237
Given textualism’s hegemony, how will living evidentiary theory win the
day in evidence law? That is, why should a judge see textualism as an inferior
model for interpreting and applying the Federal Rules of Evidence?
The answer calls for recognition that interpretation does not occur in a
vacuum. Theoretical debates over interpretive models are important, but
those debates must also descriptively account for systematic realities within
a doctrinal space.238 Evidence law is stagnating. In that state, textualism only
exacerbates evidence law’s ills. A sole ﬁxation on “ﬁdelity” forecloses any
hope of substantive evolution, as it asks judges to forgo any innovation and
instead rely on stymied rulemakers for change.239 For nearly ﬁfty years, that
model has proven ineﬀective.
A deep appreciation for the current, lethargic state of evidence law serves
to render unpersuasive many of the arguments supporting evidentiary
textualism. For instance, evidentiary textualism’s support rests, primarily, on
the revolutionary signiﬁcance of the Federal Rules of Evidence.240 As
discussed above, the Rules constituted a historic shift toward codiﬁcation and
away from evidence law’s common law roots. For some esteemed scholars, the
codiﬁcation movement constituted a ﬁnal and express abrogation of judicial
rulemaking authority over evidence law.241 In Professor Ed Imwinkelried’s
words, “[F]ederal courts no longer possess the common-law authority to
create or enforce uncodiﬁed exclusionary rules” because “[t]he Congress that
enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence was a legislature jealous of its
constitutional prerogatives.”242 Separation of powers concerns were at the
236 See Jonakait, supra note 173, at 745 (“The [Supreme] Court has imposed the plain-meaning
standard of statutory interpretation on the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court has indicated that
the plain language of the Rules now controls outcomes without regard to policy, history, practical
operation of the law of evidence, or new conditions.”).
237 See id.
238 Relatedly, it was legal formalism’s waning descriptive power that led to the rise of legal realism.
Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 849 (1935).
239 See Jonakait, supra note 173, at 784 (“The plain-meaning standard will do more than just
transform the evidentiary landscape; it will also freeze the new forms into unchanging
shapes. . . . [T]he law will be ﬁxed until Congress acts. And Congress will not act often.”).
240 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, “Importing” Restrictions from One Federal Rule of Evidence
Provision to Another: The Limits of Legitimate Contextual Interpretation in the Age of Statutes, 72 OKLA.
L. REV. 231, 232 (2020) (explaining how the Federal Rules of Evidence may have entirely superseded
evidentiary common law).
241 Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 416 (“Professor Richard Lempert, an eminent American
evidence commentator . . . stated that one notable trend was that congressional politics is becoming
an increasingly signiﬁcant force in shaping Federal Rules of Evidence used by the courts. Congress
continues to challenge the traditional, common-law judicial hegemony over evidence law.”).
242 Imwinkelried, supra note 240, at 232.
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heart of the evidentiary codiﬁcation movement and, therefore, the proper role
of a judge interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence is simply to actualize
the will of rulemakers through textualism.243
To be sure, in vacuo, there is merit in this textualist argument. The
Congress that approved the Federal Rules of Evidence was intentional in its
eﬀorts, and if it deemed rulemaking channels as the dominant avenue for
evidence law’s substantive evolution, judges should take seriously the
requirement that they defer to that bureaucratic process.244
But the game has changed. We live not in the aspirational future once
imagined by the Rules’ codiﬁers in the 1970s. Rather, we live in a world in
which the system is broken. Evidence law has not retained its historic
substantive development through rulemaking channels; the original vision of
codiﬁers has not materialized. Instead, evidence law has grown torpid. As the
world continues to evolve, unearthing revelations that render certain rules
normatively problematic or scientiﬁcally unsound, there is no concerted eﬀort
to update the code—there’s not even a widespread belief that the code could
be materially changed if there existed widespread support for a reform
measure. In the face of this less-than-idyllic reality, what is to be done?
To borrow an oft-quoted aphorism, this Article suggests that the Federal
Rules of Evidence are not an epistemological suicide pact.245 Preserving
textualism for textualism’s sake is not a worthwhile endeavor. Instead, given
present systematic realities, change is essential. Where formal channels for
amending a legal regime become functionally inoperable, judges are best
positioned to eﬀect substantive evolution. And that conclusion, though
radical, is not unprecedented. Consider, for instance, another kindred cousin
of living evidentiary theory—Judge Guido Calabresi’s prominent framework
for the judicial reinvigoration of outmoded statutory spaces. In his immensely
inﬂuential book, Calabresi examines statutory regimes that have become
obsolete due to lawmaker inaction.246 In the face of dilapidated statutes, what
is the responsibility of a judge? Is it to turn a blind eye to the ills of a
problematic system, despite a clear-eyed recognition that change will not
come through formal channels? Or, alternatively, is a judge to intervene, to
step in where others will not? Unsurprisingly, Calabresi’s prominent model
calls judges to action, forgoing textualism to instead eﬀect otherwise

243 Id. at 246 (“[The] focus [on the separation of powers] may well have contributed to the
emergence of the modern textualist approach to statutory construction.”).
244 Id. at 246-47.
245 Cf. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) (“[W]hile the Constitution
protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.”).
246 CALABRESI, supra note 38, at 163-66.
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inaccessible substantive improvements.247 Living evidentiary theory does the
same. It oﬀers a path forward where currently there is none. It forgoes
textualism and “ﬁdelity” given a more pressing need to address evidence law’s
ﬂaws. And unlike textualism, living evidentiary theory takes the world as it
is—not as we wish it would be.
*

*

*

Stepping back, the guiding light for living evidentiary theory is ultimately
a set of ideals already enshrined in the Federal Rules of Evidence. In outlining
the purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 102 notes that the Rules
seek to “administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustiﬁable expense
and delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to the end of
ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”248 And, testifying
to the importance of those ideals, a Chair of the Advisory Committee once
emphasized that Rule 102 is “not mere rhetoric. . . . [Similar] language [is not]
employed in the Civil Rules, Criminal Rules, or Appellate Rules.”249 Instead,
evidence law is sui generis and, therefore, “the Law of Evidence should have a
measure of flexibility if room for growth is to be afforded . . . . [S]ome play
[was left] in the joints.”250 Living evidentiary theory allows evidence law to live
up to those ideals. It sees evidence law returned to its natural, evolving form.
B. The Promise of Living Evidentiary Theory
Living evidentiary theory is ambitious. It seeks to bring material
progressive reform to evidence law by reinventing the existing relationship
between courts and rulemakers. It seeks to make evidence law the best it can be.
Testifying to that ambition, this subsection outlines the promise of living
evidentiary theory. The pages below oﬀer a window into the framework’s
potential by detailing how, both directly and indirectly, a more active judiciary
can renew and restore evidence law. Living evidentiary theory improves the
application of the Federal Rules of Evidence. It inspires systematic reform in
existing rulemaking structures. And, ultimately, it revives evidence law’s
perpetual march toward a superior system of truth-seeking.

247 Jonathan Macey, Executive Branch Usurpation of Power: Corporations and Capital Markets, 115
YALE L.J. 2416, 2423 (2006) (noting that Calabresi’s theory “restore[s] the traditional balance
between the judiciary and the legislature by applying common law techniques of judging to
update . . . statutory rules.” (citing id. at 82, 101-09)).
248 FED. R. EVID. 102.
249 Alston Jennings & John R. Baylor, The Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, 37 INS. COUNS. J. 565, 571 (1970).
250 Id.
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1. Substantive Reform
Without question, the most signiﬁcant beneﬁt associated with judicial
adoption of living evidentiary theory is the substantive reform it promises.
Unshackled from a cumbersome, bureaucratic rulemaking process, a living
evidentiary regime puts judges in a position to directly address widely
recognized problems in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Consider ﬁrst how a living evidentiary regime directly pursues necessary
alignment between the Federal Rules of Evidence and the leading edge of the
scientiﬁc and empirical literatures. As mentioned, scholars have long noted
that many of the Rules are anachronistic.251 Folk psychology and outdated
cultural claims serve as the predicate for admitting many unreliable pieces of
evidence. As discussed above, for instance, Rule 803(2)’s excited utterance
exception stands strong despite multiple studies questioning its empirical
basis.252 But Rule 803(2) is far from anomalous.
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1), colloquially known as the present sense
impression exception, also rests on highly specious psychology-based claims.
The present sense impression exception allows hearsay statements into the
courtroom so long as the declarant made the statement contemporaneous to
the time she observed the subject of her declaration.253 The empirical basis
that rulemakers insist supports Rule 803(1) is a psychology-based claim about
fabrication. Namely, Rule 803(1) rests on the belief that, given an exceedingly
short period of time between an observation and a statement, it will be
extremely diﬃcult for a declarant to fabricate a present sense impression.254
And, without ample time for a declarant to formulate a lie, the statement is
necessarily reliable.255 Except it’s not. Since Rule 803(1)’s enactment, leading
neurological studies have demonstrated that human capacity to formulate
false narratives is near-instantaneous.256 Within exceedingly short time
horizons, humans are able to color an observation to align with or conﬁrm an
overarching narrative.

251 Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Are Courts Obsolete?, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1385, 1391 (1992) (“[T]he
exclusionary rules of evidence in many instances are based on outdated stereotypes or asserted unfair
prejudicial eﬀect—suppositions that have never been established by empirical data.”).
252 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 28, § 272, at 366 n.7 (collecting scientiﬁc studies
undermining the psychological basis for the excited utterance exception).
253 FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
254 FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note on of advisory committee on proposed rules
(1975) (“The underlying theory of [803(1)] is that substantial contemporaneity of event and
statement negative the likelihood of deliberate of [sic] conscious misrepresentation.”).
255 See id.
256 McFarland, supra note 28, at 918 (“[S]ocial science demonstrates that liars fabricate lies
with amazing rapidity.”).
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Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(2), too, has signiﬁcant empirical
problems. Commonly known as the dying declaration exception, this hearsay
exceptions renders admissible statements from dying declarants who pinpoint
the cause of their death.257 Historically, the underlying claim supporting the
reliability of dying declarations was an insistence that those nearest to death
will speak only truth, given their imminent departure from this earth.258
Modern psychology-based studies, though, oﬀer reason for concern. Medical
science has now established that those facing imminent death often suﬀer
from material cognitive impediments. Hypoxia, for example, is a symptom
that often accompanies blood loss; a primary symptom of hypoxia is a rapid
decline in cognitive ability, such a short-term memory loss.259 Nonetheless,
the dying declaration exception would allow statements from a victim
suﬀering from hypoxia into the courtroom because of an anachronistic belief
in its outsized guarantees of trustworthiness.
Modern empirical studies demonstrate that the hearsay rule itself is
devoid of substantial empirical support, at least with respect to its purported
historical basis. In crafting Rule 801’s hearsay prohibition, most would say
that rulemakers intended to shield factﬁnders from unreliable evidence.260 Of
course, hearsay constitutes evidence that is not subjected to the crucible of
cross-examination, nor is it oﬀered by a witness subjected to the oath before
a jury.261 “Because out-of-court statements are often not presented to a jury
under those circumstances, evidence policymakers believe that there is a
substantial risk that fact ﬁnders will overvalue those out-of-court

FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 271, 318 n.258
(2006) (“The argument for reliability is the same under the new exception as it was in the eighteenth
century: no declarant wants to go to his or her death with a lie on his or her lips.”); Orenstein, supra
note 28, at 1412-13 (“The traditional theory is that, because no one would dare face the wrath of God
by dying with a lie on her lips, dying declarations are particularly trustworthy.”).
259 For one of many examples, see R. S. Kennedy, L.E. Banderet & C.S. Houston, Cognitive
Performance Deficits in a Simulated Climb of Mount Everest: Operation Everest II, 60 AVIATION, SPACE
& ENV’T. MED. 99, 99 (1989), which notes that hypoxia caused “mental functions [to] degrade[],
particularly global functions [tested such as] . . . intelligence, reasoning, and short-term memory.”;
see also Bryan A. Liang, Shortcuts to “Truth”: The Legal Mythology of Dying Declarations, 35 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 229, 240 (1998) (“[A]t simulated high altitudes [inducing hypoxia] . . . and absent any other
stresses . . . ‘mental functions . . . degraded, particularly global functions [tested such as] . . .
intelligence, reasoning, and short-term memory.’”).
260 See, e.g., United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 294 (5th Cir. 1981) (ﬁnding that Rule 801
protects the jury from statements made out of court which are not exposed to credibility safeguards
of statements taken under oath).
261 Id.
257
258
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statements.”262 Recent empirical studies, though, vitiate that fear.263 In fact,
they tend to demonstrate that laypeople generally view hearsay evidence
skeptically and as a relatively weaker form of evidence than in-person
testimony.264 Again we ﬁnd in the Federal Rules of Evidence faulty reasoning.
Despite these (and other) widely recognized empirical infirmities in the
bases underlying many of the Federal Rules of Evidence, rulemakers have
exhibited a significant reluctance to reform any evidentiary rule because of new
empirical findings. Whether that reluctance is ultimately the product of an
entrenchment effect, a reverence for the status quo, or a simple perception that
rules that aren’t causing an urgent problem don’t require a fix, the end result is
a dampening of the epistemological process in the courtroom. The employment
of an anachronistic evidentiary regime distorts the search for truth.
Living evidentiary theory promises change. By encouraging judges to
couple “ﬁdelity” with “justiﬁability,” those evidentiary rules lacking modern
empirical support immediately come under ﬁre. No longer do outdated or
unreliable evidentiary rules continue to stand solely on the basis of rulemaker
inaction. Instead, our evidentiary regime becomes deﬁned by empirics rather
than mere path dependency. The Federal Rules of Evidence are given their
best form, tailored by judges to apply in a manner that accords with (not
ignores) our best empirical and scientiﬁc understandings.
Beyond aligning our evidentiary regime with the empirical literature, a
living evidentiary regime also allows for reexamination of some of the more
problematic Rules of Evidence. That is, living evidentiary theory seeks to
equally incorporate improved cultural understandings and modern moral
norms into the application of our evidentiary regime. For example, the
preceding Section discussed how living evidentiary theory can yield a more
normatively defensible interpretation of Rule 606(b), one that seeks to combat—
not protect—animus in the jury deliberation room.265 But as in the empirical
context, that proposal for normative reform is far from anomalous. Indeed, many
other rules also demand revision in light of evolving moral norms.
Consider Federal Rule of Evidence 609. Rule 609 is, without question,
one of the most controversial rules of evidence.266 Under certain conditions,
it allows a party to impeach a witness by demonstrating that that witness has

Justin Sevier, Popularizing Hearsay, 104 GEO. L.J. 643, 650 (2016).
See Justin Sevier, Testing Tribe’s Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and Psychological Distance, 103 GEO.
L.J. 879, 914-15 (2015) (ﬁnding that data does not support the concern that jurors do not recognize
the inﬁrmities of testimonies that are not cross-examined).
264 See id. (ﬁnding that jurors systematically devalue statements to the degree those statements
contain hearsay).
265 See supra subsection II.A.1.
266 See Carodine, supra note 31, at 524.
262
263
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previously been convicted of a crime.267 Most would agree that Rule 609 thus
rests on a status claim.268 Professor Julia Simon-Kerr, for example, has
insisted that Rule 609 reﬂects the normative belief that those who have
broken the law—those deemed “criminals” in the public parlance—are
unworthy of our trust.269 The Federal Rules of Evidence therefore provide an
avenue for the jury to discover when they’re receiving testimony from tainted
lips. Needless to say, that perception of the veracity and inherent nature of
criminal oﬀenders is highly oﬀensive.270 Indeed, because of the controversial
basis underlying Rule 609, some states have already taken steps to expunge
its analog from their state evidentiary code or, alternatively, to signiﬁcantly
reduce its scope.271 Federal Rule of Evidence 609, however, stands strong. As
with the empirically questionable Rules analyzed above, rulemakers have
demonstrated little appetite to revise Rule 609 to better conform with
evolving cultural and moral sentiments.272
Living evidentiary theory again changes the game. Rather than
continuing to allow Rule 609 to play a distorting role at trial, the framework
oﬀers judges the needed latitude to evolve Rule 609 to modern moral and
cultural sentiments. And, given dislocations between Rule 609’s basis and
evolving sentiments surrounding criminal justice reform, a judge might
rightly determine that the most justiﬁable application of Rule 609 is one that
signiﬁcantly restricts its scope. The empirical literature does not support a
claim that a criminal oﬀender is a perpetual, habitual liar; modern criminal
justice reform eﬀorts likewise bring into question the historic perception of
See FED. R. EVID. 609.
Foster, supra note 30, at 5 (“Rule 609 is the product of the law’s long-standing and
dogmatic assumptions that criminal convictions reflect character, and that character determines veracity.”).
269 See Julia Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 152, 190-92, 200-01
(2017) (discussing how prior crimes have served as a proxy for who is worthy of belief); Julia SimonKerr, Moral Turpitude, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1001, 1002 (“As moral turpitude spread and was
appropriated for use in other ﬁelds, it functioned diﬀerently, working as a standard that purported
to judge character instead of reputational harm. It was used not to sort out entitlement to civil
damages, but instead to determine who should be permitted to join or continue to belong to a
particular community or who could exercise basic citizenship rights.”).
270 Blinka, The Modern Trial, supra note 31, at 688 (“Rule 609 is . . . problematic.”).
271 See Anna Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1977, 1981 (2016) (noting
that Hawaii, Kansas, and Montana are “three diverse states [that] offer examples of jurisdictions where
[impeachment through prior criminal conviction] has been rejected for decades”).
272 Such stagnation is particularly surprising in this context due to widespread concern with
its eﬀect. That is, Rule 609 does not merely rest on ﬂimsy support; it also has a signiﬁcant chilling
eﬀect on defendant testimony at trial. See Robert G. Spector, Impeaching the Defendant by His Prior
Convictions and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: A Half Step Forward and Three Steps Backward,
1 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 247, 250 (1970) (describing the prejudice caused by the introduction of past
convictions on the defendant as a “chilling eﬀect”); see also Daniel R. Tilly, Victims Under Attack:
North Carolina’s Flawed Rule 609, 97 N.C. L. REV. 1553, 1610 (2019) (emphasizing that the defendant
is the one who reaps the windfall of systemic revictimization through North Carolina Rule 609).
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a criminal oﬀender as persona non grata.273 Given these evolving
understandings, judges should correspondingly narrow Rule 609. The living
evidentiary framework makes this possible.
The relevancy rules, too, could use clariﬁcation. Generally stated, Federal
Rules of Evidence 401–03 constitute the foundation of evidence law.274 These
core rules dictate the boundaries of what factﬁnders may consider when
determining an appropriate outcome in a case. Increasingly, relevancy rules
are applied in a manner that runs contrary to evolving cultural and moral
norms. For instance, certain applications of Rules 401–03 are in tension with
an urgent national awakening regarding the invidious ills of structural and
systematic racism. Hewing closely to text and “ﬁdelity,” many courts have
narrowly interpreted the relevance rules to forbid parties from demonstrating
that systematic racism infused, infected, and inﬂuenced the factual
background of a particular case.275 But evolving cultural and moral sentiments
reveal such exclusionary decisions as deeply problematic. Revelations about
systematic racism can provide factﬁnders a robust explanatory model for the
events in a case—a model that factﬁnders might miss absent direct exposition.
Scholars have rightly emphasized that courts must often assess evidence in
light of “the purpose, pervasiveness, and permanence of racism.”276 Living
evidentiary theory again opens the door to reform. Interpreting the relevance
rules to more liberally allow for evidence of systematic racism comfortably
comports with the contours of Rules 401–03; after all, the relevance rules are,
at their core, rules for sifting out which facts matter when deciding a case.
Evolving notions of morality and fairness demand a reckoning with the role
that race plays in the dispensation of justice; thus, allowing parties to discuss
systemic forces at play in a case will often constitute the most normatively
defensible application of the relevancy rules.277
Still other examples abound. Despite Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)’s
nominal prohibition of propensity evidence, the code’s copious exceptions to
273 Carodine, supra note 31, at 524 (detailing how the historic perception of criminal oﬀenders
as untrustworthy is deeply misguided).
274 United States v. Washington, 969 F.2d 1073, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (declaring “the most
important” admissibility restriction to be “Rule 403, which requires that the ‘probative value of the
evidence not be “substantially outweighed” by its potential prejudice.’” (quoting United States v.
Miller, 895 F.2d 1431, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1990))).
275 See, e.g., Stewart v. Daimler Chrysler Fin. Servs. Ams., LLC, No. 07-60510, 2008 WL
11333226, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 19, 2008) (discussing the court’s disagreement that assertions of racism
in the workplace were relevant to the discussion of plaintiﬀ ’s individual race discrimination); Beck
v. Koppers, Inc., No. 3-03-60, 2006 WL 2228878, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 3, 2006) (ﬁnding that
evidence intimating racial discrimination was irrelevant to the case); Settle v. Fowler, No. 93-4293,
1995 WL 638597, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 1995) (ﬁnding that racist comments were irrelevant to the
case and would cause confusion for the jury).
276 Gonzales Rose, supra note 54, at 2303.
277 See id.
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Rule 404(b) have often erased a defendant’s hope for a “clean slate” at trial.278
Living evidentiary theory could demand that Rule 404(b)’s exceptions are
applied narrowly, thereby ensuring a defendant’s past mistakes do not
inﬂuence the determination of his guilt at a later trial. For far too long, the
Federal Rules of Evidence have allowed prosecutors to introduce evidence of
a defendant’s ﬂight from police as indicative of a consciousness of guilt.279
Living evidentiary theory gives courts the tools to signiﬁcantly narrow use of
ﬂight evidence, particularly given previously discussed systemic tensions that
oﬀer many alternative explanations for defendant ﬂight. Federal Rules of
Evidence 602 and 701 currently allow eyewitnesses to testify liberally
regarding what took place in a particular case, despite a growing recognition
that faulty eyewitness testimony is one of the leading causes of false
convictions.280 Living evidentiary theory can rework eyewitness testimony,
for example, by cautioning the admissibility of pretrial identiﬁcations in light
of their potential unreliability.281
The examples above are merely the tip of the iceberg. When fully
embraced, living evidentiary theory leaves no stone unturned; every rule
warrants examination. And, through that thorough and continual
introspection, the interpretive model improves truth-seeking at trial. It aligns
the code with modern empirical and scientiﬁc understandings and accords the
rules with rapidly evolving cultural and moral norms. Ultimately, living
evidentiary theory renews evidence law.
2. Systematic Reform
When detailing the substantive evolution that living evidentiary theory
can bring to the Federal Rules of Evidence, it should not be lost that the
framework also has the potential to revitalize evidence law indirectly. That is,
the emergence of the interpretive model is likely to spur other institutional
actors to take evidence law’s present ills seriously.
How, for instance, might rulemakers respond to a more active judicial
posture toward evidence law?

278 FED. R. EVID. 404(b); see also Klein, supra note 140, at 709 (“Rule 404(b) is perhaps the
most controversial of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”).
279 E.g., United States v. Benedetti, 433 F.3d 111, 116 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Flight evidence is
controversial and must be handled with care.”); Gonzales Rose, supra note 54, at 2245 (“The
investigation of the relevance of ﬂight introduces the concept of ‘racialized reality evidence’ and
demonstrates how evidence of people of color’s lived experiences of systemic racism are regularly
excluded at trial, while evidence of white norms and beliefs receives ‘implicit judicial notice.’”).
280 Bellin, supra note 148, at 309 (“The primary evidentiary contributors to false convictions
[include] mistaken eyewitness identiﬁcations.”).
281 See id.
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The most likely reaction—and the response endorsed by living
evidentiary theory—is that rulemakers drift toward a regulatory role,
sprucing judicial innovation in evidence law. The beneﬁts of that response
were explored in depth above.282 But other possibilities, of course, exist. For
instance, at the most basic level, a progressive push by the judiciary might
bring renewed urgency to the rulemaking process. At present, with no
signiﬁcant rival to their control over evidence law’s substantive development,
rulemakers have assumed a conservative approach when weighing structural
changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence, choosing to let evidence law
become outdated before risking a misstep.283 With the emergence of living
evidentiary theory, though, comes an alternative model for change. Now, the
judiciary too is oﬀered a principled basis for renewing their role in evidence
law’s progression. In response to their fading monopoly, rulemakers might
discover a more ambitious posture toward their own work. Progressive
reforms might ﬁnd their way through the arduous amendment process. The
system could begin to work as designed.
As emphasized throughout this Article, though, much of the stagnancy
that now exists in evidence law is the fault of structural barriers outside of the
control of rulemakers. For example, regardless of how ambitious and
committed certain members of the Advisory Committee are, the process for
amending the Federal Rules of Evidence is simply too cumbersome to serve
as a mechanism for continual substantive change.284 A second response that
living evidentiary theory might inspire, then, is structural reform. That is, if
living evidentiary theory reveals the existing positivist system as broken,
some might naturally seek to ﬁx it. And here, too, is reform potential
immense. For example, empowering the Advisory Committee to
independently revise the Federal Rules of Evidence could help ameliorate the
overbearing burden of the Rules’ current amendment process and remove
related fears that one misstep could prove an intractable error for evidence law.
Increasing the size of the Advisory Committee to include more practitioners,
academics, and stakeholders would simultaneously ensure that the rulemaking
process does not become obstructed by one powerful interest group, again
increasing the likelihood that needed change comes swiftly to evidence law.285
See supra subsection II.A.2.
Teter, supra note 4, at 160 (“The evidentiary rulemaking process is inherently conservative.”).
Bellin, supra note 148, at 327 (describing how proposed amendments to the Federal
Rules of Evidence have been quashed by Congress even after receiving enthusiastic support
from the Advisory Committee).
285 Paul R. Rice, Back to the Future with Privileges Abandon Codification, Not the Common Law,
38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 739, 779 (2004) (“The . . . reason the Advisory Committee process has been
an inadequate and largely ineﬀective method for maintaining the evidence rules is that special
interest groups have been introduced into the rule-making process.”).
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In the face of these potential alternative responses, how should a living
evidentiary theorist respond?
With enthusiasm. Recall that living evidentiary theory emphasizes
“justiﬁcation” over “ﬁdelity” only when controlling law—the Federal Rules of
Evidence—is stagnate, outdated, and problematic.286 Because evidence law
has become a frozen positivist landscape, the judiciary currently constitutes
the best (and perhaps only) means of revivifying doctrine. But the model is
dynamic. If the emergence of living evidentiary theory motivates rulemakers
toward structural reform, the framework does not call for continual power
struggle. As emphasized repeatedly, living evidentiary theory is not a call for
a bare judicial power grab. Rather, at its core, it is a call for evidence law’s
renewal. If the simple emergence of the interpretive framework is suﬃcient
to inspire positivist wheels to again turn toward evidence law’s substantive
development, that is a victory. In this way, living evidentiary theory acts as a
check, not as a brute vehicle for vetoing rules on the basis of substantive
disagreement, but instead as a sophisticated mechanism for ensuring the
urgent revitalization of evidence law.
CONCLUSION
Is evidence law compatible with codiﬁcation? This Article seeks to suggest
that, at least at present, the answer is no. The Federal Rules of Evidence
constitute an admirable project; it is certainly a monumental achievement to
have crafted an evidentiary regime in 1975 that still enjoys widespread
legitimacy almost a half century later. But for how long will that legitimacy
last? The empirical literature has evolved signiﬁcantly since the initial
codiﬁcation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, so much so that judges,
litigants, and scholars now chuckle at the folk psychology contained within
its pages.287 Cultural norms, too, have evolved. Rules that disadvantage
rehabilitated criminal oﬀenders and protect discriminatory animus in the
courtroom are rightly seen as problematic. Yet, these ills arise from the same
root problem—a perception that evidence law is dead. Judicial authority over
evidence, we’re told, vanished with the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. But reformers have faced frozen legal landscapes before. In those
contexts, a “living” judicial posture toward positive law was the key for
substantive reviviﬁcation. It’s time for evidence law, too, to embrace revival.

See supra subsection I.A.1.
See, e.g., Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 588 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (discussing how
the folk psychology of evidence is diﬃcult to take seriously as rationale); Richter, supra note 186, at
918-19 (“Judge Posner has suggested that the present sense impression and excited utterance exceptions
represent nothing more than baseless ‘folk psychology’ and laments a judge’s obligation to admit them.”).
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